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THE TWO COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTIES 
OR BASSOK* 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the countermajoritarian difficulty has split into two.  
According to its traditional version, the difficulty arises when unaccountable 
Justices strike down statutes passed by electorally accountable branches of 
government.  According to the newer, literal version, the difficulty arises when 
Justices strike down statutes that are supported by the majority according to 
public opinion polls.  By explicating the difference between the two versions of 
the difficulty, I expose the deep influence of public opinion polls on American 
constitutional thought.  For many years, scholars conflated the two difficulties 
under one banner and offered normative justifications for the Court’s 
countermajoritarian authority.  In recent years, many constitutional theorists, 
oriented toward social science, attempt to dissolve the literal 
countermajoritarian difficulty by showing that the Court is not countering the 
majority will but following it.  I further demonstrate that the distinction helps 
to explain four additional issues of constitutional theory.  First, this distinction 
explains the connection between the countermajoritarian difficulty and the 
“passive virtues” technique that Alexander Bickel devised for the Court.  
Second, it exposes the importance of the distinction between cases that the 
media covers and non-visible cases.  Third, it sheds new light on the basis of 
the Court’s power.  Finally, this distinction is crucial for a better 
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INTRODUCTION 
The countermajoritarian (hereinafter “CM”) difficulty is changing.  Long 
before Alexander Bickel conceptualized the problem and gave it its catchy 
name,1 the tension between constitutionalism and democracy was understood 
to arise from the authority of unaccountable judges to invalidate legislation 
enacted by electorally accountable representatives.2  This conceptualization of 
the CM difficulty, to which I refer as “traditional,” has obsessed American 
legal academia for decades.3  The main tactic for tackling it has been to 
propose justifications for the Court’s CM authority.4 
Following the invention of scientific public opinion polls and especially 
with the rise of “public-opinion culture,”5 a second understanding of the CM 
difficulty has emerged.  According to this literal understanding, the difficulty 
arises when the Court decides to invalidate legislation that enjoys the support 
of the majority of the population, as captured by public opinion polls before 
the decision or shortly thereafter.6  The “literal” nature of this formulation of 
the difficulty is embedded in the premise that “majority will” is scientifically 
measured by public opinion polls.  Scholars find this premise controversial, yet 
 
 1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
 2. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The 
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 342–43 (1998) (acknowledging “some 
limited countermajoritarian criticism in virtually every era in American history”); Robert W. 
Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 845, 846 
(2001) (“Bickel was certainly not the first to express concern about judicial review, nor the first to 
associate that difficulty with the nondemocratic nature of the courts.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 2, at 334 (“The ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has been 
the central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.”); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme 
Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 104 (“[I]t is not wrong to 
characterize American legal thought as ‘obsessed’ with the moral problem of judicial review.”). 
 4. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 659 (2011) (“[T]he leading question in constitutional 
theory for generations has been how to justify constitutional limitations on the authority of 
democratic majorities given our background commitments to popular sovereignty and self-
government—the infamous ‘countermajoritarian difficulty.’”). 
 5. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75 
(2010) (“Right or wrong, decades of polling have had a profound impact on the public mind.”); 
SUSAN HERBST, NUMBERED VOICES: HOW OPINION POLLING HAS SHAPED AMERICAN POLITICS 
12 (1993) (“Quantitative surveys, both scientific and unscientific, are now a pervasive component 
of public discourse . . . .”). 
 6. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2596, 2596 (2003) (“There is a regrettable lack of clarity in the relevant scholarship about what 
‘countermajoritarian’ actually means.  At bottom it often seems to be a claim, and perhaps must 
be a claim, that when judges invalidate governmental decisions based upon constitutional 
requirements, they act contrary to the preferences of the citizenry.  Some variation on this premise 
seems to drive most normative scholarship regarding judicial review.”). 
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it is undisputed in the public discourse where polls’ results are presented as the 
will of the people.7  While justifications of the Court’s CM authority are 
usually formulated in a manner that allows them to confront the literal version 
of the difficulty, the distinct main tactic for tackling this version has been to 
dissolve it, by showing that the Court actually follows majority opinion. 
This Article emphasizes the importance of the distinction between the two 
CM difficulties for understanding constitutional theory fifty years after Bickel 
published The Least Dangerous Branch.8  I begin by exploring the historical 
background as well as the conceptual meaning of this under-theorized split in 
the definition of the CM difficulty.  The second section surveys prominent 
attempts to justify the Court’s CM authority.  Next, I explore mechanisms 
offered to dissolve the CM difficulty in its literal sense.  I then examine what is 
left of the CM difficulty in view of these dissolution efforts. 
After establishing the distinction between the two CM difficulties and 
exploring the paths taken to confront them, I turn to examine the explanatory 
power of this distinction in four additional constitutional issues.  Using this 
distinction permits a better understanding of the connection between Bickel’s 
discussion of the CM difficulty in the first part of The Least Dangerous Branch 
and the “passive virtues” device that he offered in the second part of the book.9  
At the time he wrote the book, before the rise of the “public-opinion culture,” 
Bickel could not fully comprehend the CM difficulty in its literal sense.  
However, he did devise a technique to counter the dangers that stem from it.  
Next, I explain why visibility of cases in the media is important for the efforts 
to dissolve the CM difficulty in its literal sense, but not for the attempts to 
justify the Court’s CM authority.  Based on the distinction between the two 
difficulties, I explain two distinct understandings of the basis of the Court’s 
power.  One understanding anchors the Court’s power in its expertise, the other 
in public support. While both ways to understand the Court’s power may have 
existed in parallel throughout the Court’s history, the rise of public opinion 
polls has sharpened the distinction between these two understandings.  Finally, 
I demonstrate that the CM difficulty in its literal sense is at the center of an 
important puzzle in the field of comparative constitutional law.  Thus, though 
the CM difficulty has been considered for many years as an exceptional 
American obsession, its split into two difficulties exposes that this truism is 
inaccurate. 
 
 7. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 75–76. 
 8. BICKEL, supra note 1. 
 9. See id. at 111–98. 
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I.  DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE TWO CM DIFFICULTIES 
A. Historical Background 
The CM difficulty captures two fundamental components of democratic 
government: majoritarianism and electoral accountability.10  Judicial review of 
legislation may entail not only an unaccountable institution scrutinizing the 
work of an accountable one, but also a non-majoritarian institution countering 
majority opinion.  However, the separateness of these two components became 
vivid only as polls measuring public support for the Court’s decisions 
proliferated in the 1960s, and with the rise of public polling in the public mind 
to the status of an on-going referendum.11 
Before the invention of scientific opinion polls and the rise of the public-
opinion culture, majoritarianism and electoral accountability were conflated in 
discussions of the CM difficulty.  Though the concept of public opinion in its 
modern sense as the collective voice of the popular will appeared already in the 
eighteenth century,12 there was no viable tool for measuring it (except on 
election-day) before the invention of scientific public opinion polls in the 
1930s.13  Thus, many thought, “Congress was public opinion.”14  Hence, 
countering the will of Congress meant contravening the will of the public 
majority. 
Moreover, even after the invention of scientific public polling, it took time 
until public support for the Court and its decisions was measured.  Polling had 
been institutionalized by the White House in the 1930s, yet it has become a 
 
 10. See, e.g., Kevin L. Yingling, Note, Justifying the Judiciary: A Majoritarian Response to 
the Countermajoritarian Problem, 15 J.L. & POL. 81, 106 (1999) (“Just as majoritarianism is 
fundamental to democracy, electoral accountability is also an indispensable feature.”). 
 11. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 75 (“Nowadays, Americans simply take it for 
granted that the polls serve as kind of privatized voting system, providing a rolling referendum on 
the president’s democratic standing.”); GEORGE F. BISHOP, THE ILLUSION OF PUBLIC OPINION: 
FACT AND ARTIFACT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS 66–67 (2005) (discussing the dangers 
in the growing tendency to present opinion polls as a referendum on public opinion). 
 12. John Durham Peters, Historical Tensions in the Concept of Public Opinion, in PUBLIC 
OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 3, 9, 11–14 (Theodore L. Glasser & Charles T. 
Salmon eds., 1995) [hereinafter Peters (1995)] (“Public opinion is, first of all, an 18th-century 
invention, not an eternal given of human life.”); John Durham Peters, Realism in Social 
Representation and the Fate of the Public, in PUBLIC OPINION & DEMOCRACY VOX POPULI-VOX 
DEI? 85, 86 (Slavko Splichal ed., 2001) (“The idea of a public realm of citizens or a sociological 
aggregate—’the public’—did not exist until the eighteenth century.”). 
 13. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 75 (before the introduction of public opinion polls 
there was “no way to prove” public support between elections); Peters (1995), supra note 12, at 
14 (“By the 1920s and 1930s, public opinion was reconceived as a measurable quantity that could 
be tapped by survey research.”). 
 14. Amy Fried & Douglas B. Harris, Governing with the Polls, 72 HISTORIAN 321, 341 
(2010). 
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central preoccupation of presidents only since the 1970s.15  Amongst 
Congressional members, polling had become a common practice by the mid-
1960s.16  Gallup began conducting polls to measure public confidence in the 
Supreme Court as early as the late 1930s, but it was not until the 1960s that the 
Gallup and Harris organizations began to track public support for the Court 
and its decisions in any systematic way.17 
Hence, at the beginning of the 1960s, the period in which The Least 
Dangerous Branch was written, public opinion polls had yet to attain their 
current status in the public discourse as reliable reflections of popular 
sentiment.18  Thus, Bickel could write with confidence that “[m]ost assuredly, 
no democracy operates by taking continuous nose counts on the broad range of 
daily governmental activities.”19  Since only following the rise of the public-
opinion culture, a literal understanding of the CM difficulty could arise, there 
is no wonder that Bickel conflated the two CM difficulties.20  He coined the 
phrase “counter-majoritarian,” which is suitable for the literal sense, while 
probably trying to describe the traditional sense of the problem.21  The more 
 
 15. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 24–25 (“White House interest in polling began with 
Roosevelt, but it only became a central preoccupation under Richard Nixon.”); ROBERT M. 
EISINGER, THE EVOLUTION OF PRESIDENTIAL POLLING 1–5 (2003); Fried & Harris, supra note 
14, at 332–39. 
 16. See Fried & Harris, supra note 14, at 339–45; EISINGER, supra note 15, at 6–7. 
 17. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT 1–2, 29, 77 
(2008) (“Until the 1930s there was no direct test by which to tell whether or not Supreme Court 
decisions agreed with American public opinion.”); Roger Handberg, Public Opinion and the 
United States Supreme Court 1935-1981, 59 INT’L. SOC. SCI. REV. 3, 5 (1984); Gregory A. 
Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1210–12 (1986). 
 18. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 74. 
 19. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 17.  However, Bickel was not oblivious to the potential effects 
of the polling technology on the role of the Court.  See id. at 239 (“Surely the political institutions 
are more fitted than the Court to find and express an existing consensus—so long, at least, as the 
science of opinion sampling is no further developed than it is.”). 
 20. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1531 
(1990) (“Bickel too cavalierly glides over the distinctions between representative government and 
majoritarianism when it comes to labeling the ‘difficulty’ with judicial review.”); Terri Peretti, An 
Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch, in THE JUDICIARY AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 123, 125–26 (Kenneth D. Ward and Cecilia R. 
Castillo eds., 2005) (examining Bickel’s different uses of the term “majority will”). 
 21. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 16–19; see also Eule, supra note 20, at 1531 (describing the 
two available interpretations to the CM difficulty and noting that “[Bickel] described judicial 
review as thwarting ‘the will of representatives’”); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional 
Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1298 (2004) (“[Bickel] claimed that the requirements of 
democracy are satisfied so long as ‘a representative majority has the power to accomplish a 
reversal’ of policy.” (quoting BICKEL, supra note 1, at 17)).  Contra David S. Law, A Theory of 
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proper name for the traditional difficulty should have been the “counter-
representative” difficulty.22 
Robert Dahl’s famous 1957 article on the responsiveness of the Court to 
the “dominant national alliance” used the position of the legislative majority in 
Congress four years or fewer before the Court’s decision as a surrogate for 
majority will since “scientific opinion polls are of relatively recent origin.”23  
Thus, Dahl argued that “[f]or the greater part of the Court’s history, . . . there is 
simply no way of establishing with any high degree of confidence whether a 
given alternative was or was not supported by a majority or a minority of 
adults or even of voters.”24 
Only after decades of constant polling reshaped our notion of democratic 
legitimacy did the difficulty capturing the clash between constitutionalism and 
democracy change to reflect the new reality in which opinion polls serve as an 
authoritative democratic legitimator.25  With the rise of public-opinion culture, 
the term “public opinion” came to be synonymous with poll results.26  
Congress was no longer considered as the voice of the popular will, rather, 
opinion polls were.  This development opened the path for the rise of the literal 
version of the CM difficulty. 
B. Conceptual Analysis 
Today, one can speak of two CM difficulties.27  In its traditional sense, the 
CM difficulty deals with “the question of whether the democratic principle of 
majority rule can be reconciled with the practice of remotely accountable 
 
Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 728 n.15 (2009) (noting that according to 
Bickel’s account, “there is nothing countermajoritarian about judicial review unless one equates 
the acts of elected officials with the wishes of a majority”). 
 22. Eule, supra note 20, at 1531–32 (noting that “[Bickel’s] error is less in his theory than in 
his terminology” and suggesting the terms “counter-representative” or “counter-republican” as 
better labels for the difficulty). 
 23. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L 279, 283 (1957).  But cf. Pildes, supra note 3, at 117 (claiming that 
Dahl preferred legislative outcomes since another concept would be difficult if not impossible to 
pin down). 
 24. Dahl, supra note 23, at 284. 
 25. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 75–76; SARAH E. IGO, THE AVERAGED AMERICAN: 
SURVEYS, CITIZENS, AND THE MAKING OF A MASS PUBLIC 12–13, 18–19 (2007) (showing that 
polls’ results serve as social facts with considerable authority); Peters (1995), supra note 12, at 14 
(“Since [the 1930s] the polling of ‘public opinion’ has been installed as both a symbol of 
democratic life and a cog in the machinery of the market and the state.”). 
 26. See BISHOP, supra note 11, at 6; HERBST, supra note 5, at 63 (“[S]cholars writing from 
the 1940s to the present have been forced to contend with the notion that polls are becoming 
synonymous with public opinion.”); Fried & Harris, supra note 14, at 323–24, 353. 
 27. Cf. Law, supra note 21, at 728 (elaborating the “two senses in which judicial review 
might be described as countermajoritarian”). 
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judges invalidating legislation enacted by electorally accountable 
representatives.”28  The emphasis is on the difficulty of Justices striking down 
statutes passed by electorally-accountable branches of the government, and not 
on the majority support for these statutes.29 
Accountability allows the public to replace its representatives through 
periodical elections and for whatever reason.  Elected branches are responsible 
to the electorate.30  Justices, on the other hand, are not directly and regularly 
accountable to the electorate or to its representatives.  While they must survive 
a majoritarian process of nomination and confirmation administrated by 
elected representatives,31 there is no effective mechanism for holding them 
accountable to the public and its representatives once on the bench.32  Justices 
cannot be replaced directly by the electorate, nor can the elected 
representatives dismiss them at will.  Indeed, they rarely bear the costs of their 
mistakes.33 
The literal version of the CM difficulty emphasizes the majoritarian aspect 
of democracy, i.e. the Court’s responsiveness to public opinion.  Elected 
branches are responsive to the majority’s will as expressed in elections and in 
 
 28. Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 491, 492 (1997). 
 29. See ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM AND THE 
ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 7–9 (2000) (discussing the CM 
difficulty); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–5 
(1980) (“[T]he central function, and it is at the same time the central problem, of judicial review 
[is that] a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is 
telling the people’s elected representatives that they cannot govern as they’d like.”); Aharon 
Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
16, 48 (2002) (“Critics of my theory argue that the non-accountability of judges should deprive 
them of the power to void statutes.  Such power must only be given to the representatives of the 
people, who are accountable to them.  This is the countermajoritarian argument made again and 
again.”). 
 30. See Dennis Murashko, Accountability and Constitutional Federalism: Reconsidering 
Federal Conditional Spending Programs in Light of Democratic Political Theory, Comment, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 931, 939 (2007) (discussing different meanings of the term “accountable” and 
stating that “[f]or their actions, public officials are responsible to the electorate”). 
 31. Thus, they can be considered to be indirectly accountable to the public.  See, e.g., 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO 
THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 9–10 (1982) 
(distinguishing between direct and indirect accountability); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the 
Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1391 (2006) (“The President is elected and 
people often know what sort of persons he is likely to appoint to the Supreme Court, and the U.S. 
Senators who have to approve the appointments are elected also, and their views on this sort of 
thing may be known as well.  True, the Justices are not regularly held accountable in the way 
legislators are, but, as we have already remarked, we are not looking for perfection.”). 
 32. LIPKIN, supra note 29, at 246 n.31. 
 33. Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 
1575 (1988). 
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other manifestations such as opinion polls.  They adopt policies that are 
signaled as preferred by citizens.34  Justices, on the other hand, have lifetime 
tenure, which relieves them from the need to be responsive to the majority (of 
the public or its representatives), as well as an ethos of unresponsiveness to 
popular pressure.35 
Some commentators, even today, conflate the Court’s countering elected 
and accountable institutions with the Court’s countering public opinion.36  
Others, like Nathaniel Persily, understand and adopt the literal version 
wholeheartedly: “After all, if the Court merely reflected public opinion in its 
decisions, then whatever other problems it might have, it could not be 
described as countermajoritarian.”37  According to the traditional version of the 
CM difficulty, this statement is false.  The fact that the Court’s decision aligns 
with the majority’s views does not negate, at least as a formal matter, the 
 
 34. See, e.g., Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski & Susan C. Stokes, Introduction to 
DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 1, 9 (Adam Przeworski, Susan C. 
Stokes & Bernand Manin eds., 1999) (“These signals may include public opinion polls . . . .”); 
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 33–38 (1980) (“[T]he empirical 
surveys divulge that congressmen feel that their voting records will contribute significantly to 
their election and thus they are strongly influenced by their perception of their constituents’ 
preferences.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908) (“Constitutional questions . . . are 
not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written 
constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action . . . .”); James G. 
Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1037, 
1120 (“[M]any Justices have separated the judicial domain, excluding public opinion, from the 
political domain, where public opinion reigns supreme.”); Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based 
Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 44 (1993) (“[T]he courts are 
not, either in their ethos or image, elective institutions, whereas parliament—whatever its 
imperfections—obviously is.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Scott E. Lemieux & David J. Watkins, Beyond the “Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty”: Lessons from Contemporary Democratic Theory, 41 POLITY 30, 32 (2009) (“It is 
assumed that when courts exercise judicial review, they are contravening the will of the political 
branches, and therefore by extension the will of the majority.”). 
 37. Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 3, 5 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008); see also 
Friedman, supra note 6, at 2605 (“Ultimately, the [CM] claim (and the fear) must be that judges 
strike down popular laws.”); Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1212–13 (2010) (“[T]he countermajoritarian difficulty is a normative 
problem that attaches to those decisions in which courts . . . contravene the majority’s 
preference. . . . [C]ourts make constitutional decisions with which most Americans disagree.”); 
Peretti, supra note 20, at 125–41 (arguing that the Court is not CM since it “decides consistently 
with public opinion a majority of the time”). 
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problem with an electorally unaccountable institution striking down laws 
enacted by an elected and accountable institution.38 
The two versions of the CM difficulty are obviously connected.  As 
Michael Perry notes, “one important reason we value electorally accountable 
policymaking is that we think it more sensitive to the sentiments of the 
majorities than is policymaking that is not electorally accountable.”39  Indeed, 
laws ordinarily correspond to the majority’s preferences.40  Yet, the two 
difficulties are still distinct from each other.  When, according to public 
opinion polls, the public supports the Court’s decision to overrule a statute, the 
Court’s decision is not CM in the literal sense.  However, it is still CM in the 
traditional sense since an unaccountable institution struck down a statute that 
was passed by electorally accountable branches of government.41  The Court 
acts in a CM manner in the traditional sense whenever it invalidates a statute 
enacted by an elected body, and not only, as the literal definition of the CM 
difficulty entails, when it invalidates statutes that enjoy popular support.42 
Similarly, the Court may enjoy public support as an institution making it in 
a sense a “majoritarian institution,” yet it remains a “deviant institution in the 
American democracy” since it is CM in the traditional sense.43  Moreover, the 
Court may enjoy durable majoritarian support as an institution even while 
deciding some cases in a CM fashion in the literal sense.  The public may 
disagree with certain decisions making them CM in the literal sense.  However, 
the more durable public support for the Court as an institution can transcend 
such reactions to the Court’s concrete performance and remain unscathed.44  
Hence, the Court may be a majoritarian institution in the literal sense while 
deciding some cases against public opinion i.e., deciding literally in a CM 
 
 38. See Friedman, supra note 6, at 2596 & n.3 (detecting a “lack of clarity” in the definition 
of the CM difficulty concerning the question whether the difficulty is with “the substance of 
judicial decisions (i.e., that they do not comport with outcomes the majority would prefer) or the 
process of judicial decisionmaking (i.e., that judges are unaccountable in an electoral sense).”). 
 39. PERRY, supra note 31, at 170 n.4. 
 40. See Eule, supra note 20, at 1532. 
 41. David Kairys, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1, 19 
n.16 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (“[W]hen legislatures act counter to the will or inclinations 
of the majority of their constituents, judicial invalidation of legislation can be both majoritarian 
(in the sense that most people support it) and countermajoritarian (in the sense that a court is 
negating the action of a majoritarian institution).”). 
 42. See PERRY, supra note 31, at 170 n.4 (“[T]he political principle to which we are 
philosophically committed demands only that poicymaking be electorally accountable, not that it 
necessarily generate policies supported by a majority of the electorate . . . .”). 
 43. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 18. 
 44. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme 
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 636–38 (1992); Friedman, supra note 6, at 2614–17. 
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fashion.  However, overtime, sustained disappointment with the Court’s 
decisions will lead to a decline in the durable support that the Court enjoys.45 
The technological change that separated public opinion from the 
representatives’ position brought to light the distinction between the two CM 
difficulties.  However, it should be stressed that the split between the two CM 
difficulties is not between countering public opinion and countering the 
opinions of representatives.  The literal difficulty deals with Court’s decisions 
countering majority public opinion.46  The traditional difficulty deals with 
striking down legislation of an electorally accountable institution by an 
institution that is unaccountable. 
II.  JUSTIFYING THE COURT’S CM AUTHORITY 
For many years, scholars who confronted the CM difficulty had usually 
done so by proposing normative justifications for the Court’s CM authority.  
Until recently, however, the two definitions of the CM difficulty had been 
conflated.  Therefore, scholars did not usually examine whether the 
justification they proposed addressed one or both of these difficulties. 
These justifications typically have a two-step format.  First, the scholar 
explicates a worthy normative goal that can be extracted from the 
 
 45. Friedman, supra note 6, at 2615 (“[I]ntense enough specific disagreement with an 
institution ultimately will have an impact on diffuse support.”); CHOPER, supra note 34, at 139 
(“At some point—the exact location of which is unknown, but the existence in fact virtually 
undisputed—the Court’s continued antimajoritarian rulings will tip the balance of credit 
accumulation and expenditures and animate a public sentiment that it has but a gossamer claim to 
legitimacy in a democratic society . . . .”). 
 46. A further distinction between the will of the majority of the public and the will of the 
current majority of the representatives can be made.  Thus, the CM difficulty in its literal version 
can be split into two.  One version deals with the Court that counters the opinion of majority of 
the public; the other deals with the Court that counters the opinion of the current majority of 
representatives.  Indeed, it is possible for the majority of representatives to support a law that runs 
against public opinion.  It is also possible for the majority of representative to oppose a law, 
without repealing it, although the public supports the law.  See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL 
PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 49–53 (2005) (showing that Congress can diverge from popular opinion 
substantially and for a significant period of time).  While such a distinction is not a meaningless 
exercise in hair splitting, it is not the focus of my argument and thus for the purposes of clarity I 
will disregard it.  For discussion on this distinction see LIPKIN, supra note 29, at 11 (“Even in a 
direct, participatory democracy, a ‘new’ majority must wait for elections to give its voice 
effect.”); Pildes, supra note 3, at 120 (“[T]he Lochner era’s activism might have reflected 
majority popular opinion even as the Court overturned lawmaking majorities.”); John Ferejohn & 
Pasquale Pasquino, The Countermajoritarian Opportunity, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 353, 360–65 
(2010) (“In any representative democracy it is always possible to have a double majority where 
the parliamentary and popular majorities diverge, and this indeed becomes likely as the election 
recedes in time.”). 
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Constitution,47 such as protecting disadvantaged groups of society, preserving 
democratic procedures, and guarding certain basic moral values.48  Second, the 
scholar explains why the mission of achieving this goal is “peculiarly suited to 
the capabilities of the courts,” and “will not likely be performed elsewhere if 
the courts do not assume it.”49 
All the justifications for the Court’s CM authority share two other 
important features: first, according to all of the approaches, the Court’s CM 
authority is acknowledged and embraced, not dissolved or condemned.50  
Second, each justification for the Court’s CM authority serves as an 
Archimedean point of agreement, a shared perspective.  From an external point 
of view, each justification may be contested.  But from the point of view 
internal to constitutional discourse, the adopted justification serves as the 
metric according to which all arguments are measured.  Indeed, within the 
boundaries of a system that adopted a certain justification, the power of a legal 
argument is measured by its persuasiveness in terms of that justification.  A 
few prominent examples of justifications for the Court’s CM authority will 
demonstrate these points. 
A. Rights-Based Arguments 
Rights-based arguments seek to justify the Court’s CM authority by 
claiming that certain basic rights are required in order to achieve the 
constitutional commitment to freedom, independence, equality, the full 
humanity of every member of society, or any other concern that stands at the 
basis of the Constitution.51  Such arguments hold (or at least assume) that due 
to their special training or their relative insularity from public opinion (or 
 
 47. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 11 (1991) (describing 
the common thread of “rights foundationalists” as “[w]hatever rights are Right, all agree that the 
American constitution is concerned, first and foremost, with their protection”). 
 48. Roberto Gargarella, In Search of a Democratic Justice – What Courts Should Not Do: 
Argentina, 1983-2002, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY 
FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 181, 182 (Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella & Elin 
Skaar eds., 2004) (describing several justifications for the CM authority). 
 49. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 24. 
 50. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 28, at 492 (“One familiar response turns the tables by 
treating the difficulty as a virtue.”);  Lemieux & Watkins, supra note 36, at 32 (“[T]he 
countermajoritarian nature of the courts is a good thing, because courts are uniquely well situated 
to protect the rights of individuals or disadvantaged groups against an excessively powerful 
majority.”). 
 51. See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the 
Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 638–39 (2003) (“[T]he foundational moral commitment 
of liberal democracy is to the true and full humanity of every human being—and, therefore, to the 
inviolability of every human being—without regard to race, sex, religion, etc.  This commitment 
is axiomatic for liberal democracy.”); Waldron, supra note 35, at 20–21 (specifying various 
concerns at the basis of theories of rights). 
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both), judges enjoy some institutional advantages over legislators with respect 
to the process of discovering, asserting, and implementing human rights.52  
Subsequently, judicial review is justified as a necessary means to guarantee the 
protection of these rights.53 
B. Process-Based Arguments 
Process-based arguments read the Constitution as anchoring a thin 
normative goal.  “[P]reserving fundamental values is not an appropriate 
constitutional task,”54 and thus, besides the procedure of political 
majoritarianism, no other value is constitutionally entrenched.55 
According to the process-based justification, first raised in Carolene 
Products’ footnote four56 and further developed most famously by Ely,57 in 
order to prefect democracy, the role of detecting democratic procedural 
malfunctions should be entrusted in the hands of the judiciary.  While courts 
are inferior to legislators in making substantive judgments, judges are “experts 
on process and . . . political outsiders,” “uniquely situated to ‘impose’” 
process-based values.58  Hence, the intervention in majoritarian decisions by 
judicial review can only be justified when it is required to correct failure in the 
democratic majoritarian process.59  Judicial review to secure rights is 
appropriate in instances in which these rights are constitutive of a well-
functioning majoritarian process.60 
 
 52. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 51, at 654–57 (“[M]any articulated human rights are not 
likely to be optimally protected in a democracy unless politically independent courts play a 
significant role in protecting them.”). 
 53. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (2009) (“Majority rule by itself cannot be trusted to 
protect religious, political, racial, and geographic minorities from oppression, nor to protect 
fundamental human rights when they are needed by the powerless or the unpopular.”). 
 54. ELY, supra note 29, at 88; see also Ernest Young, The Trouble with Global 
Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527, 530 (2003) (“[T]he main restrictions on governmental 
power under the American Constitution are procedural rather than substantive in nature.”). 
 55. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 29, at 181 (“[J]udicial review . . . can appropriately concern 
itself only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political 
choice under attack.”). 
 56. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 57. ELY, supra note 29, at 75–77 (characterizing his own theory as filling in the outlines of 
Carolene Products). 
 58. ELY, supra note 29, at 75 n.*, 75–77, 88, 102, 112. 
 59. See Samuel Estreicher, Platonic Guardians of Democracy: John Hart Ely’s Role for the 
Supreme Court in the Constitution’s Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 552–54 (1981); see 
also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (1979) (“The footnote identified two instances of legislative failure: abridgment of 
the right to vote and victimization of a discrete and insular minority . . . .”). 
 60. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 46 (2001) 
(discussing process-based justifications). 
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Process-based theories do not only justify the Court’s CM authority, they 
also partly dissolve the CM difficulty in its literal sense.  These theories 
acknowledge that due to failures in the democratic process, laws do not 
necessarily represent the will of the electorate.  Thus, limiting the Court’s 
interventions to instances in which it can perfect, rather than override, the 
workings of the majoritarian political process ensures that the CM difficulty in 
its literal formulation is partly dissolved.61  Indeed, process-based theories aim 
only to police majoritarianism democracy, not to override it by making 
substantive choices, as do justification theories that offer a substantive vision.62  
Yet, process-based theories do not suggest that the Court’s interventions are 
limited to cases in which a certain law counters the majority’s view.  Their aim 
is to protect the process of political majoritarianism, not to dissolve the CM 
difficulty in its literal sense.63 
C. Dworkin’s Empire 
Ronald Dworkin’s argument combines the rights-based and process-based 
approaches.64  According to Dworkin, the goal of democracy is to ensure that 
each person receives equal concern and respect for his or her basic rights by 
the institutions of government, not that the majority of the citizens necessarily 
or usually get its way.65  Judicial review can thus be justified if it increases the 
 
 61. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
875, 895 (2003); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 859, 893–95 (2009). 
 62. ELY, supra note 29, at 103; see also RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 34, 
69 (1985) (analyzing process-based approaches as suggesting that “the Court can avoid 
trespassing on democracy by policing the processes of democracy itself”); Fiss, supra note 59, at 
6 (“The theory of legislative failure should be understood as a general presumption in favor of 
majoritarianism . . . .”); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 148–49 (1992) (“[T]he Court’s role is limited to 
remedying the process; it may not substitute its value judgments for those of elected 
institutions.”). 
 63. ELY, supra note 29, at 103 (“Our government cannot fairly be said to be 
‘malfunctioning’ simply because it sometimes generates outcomes with which we disagree, 
however strongly . . . .”). 
 64. Compare Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 133, 143 (1997) (book review) (“It may be useful to think of Dworkin’s approach to the 
practice of judicial review as belonging to the same family as John Hart Ely’s approach.”), with 
Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 824 (1999) (“[M]ajoritarian 
procedures are adopted to guarantee equal status for individuals, not to satisfy the goals of 
majority rule.”). 
 65. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 16–17 (1996) (rejecting the “majoritarian premise” and arguing that “the defining 
aim of democracy [is] . . . that collective decisions be made by political institutions whose 
structure, composition, and practices treat all members of the community, as individuals, with 
equal concern and respect”); id. at 72–78, 212–16; DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 32 (noting that 
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likelihood of fulfilling this goal.  As with rights-based approaches, the goal is 
to protect rights, not majoritarian procedures.66  But due to his broad definition 
of democracy, Dworkin views a failure to respect the moral equality of all 
citizens as a democratic malfunction that justifies a review of legislation.67  
Thus, by adopting a broader definition of democracy, Dowrkin is able to argue, 
in the spirit of the process-based approach, that judicial review strengthens 
rather than undermines democracy.68 
While Dworkin denies that judges enjoy some inherent advantages over 
other officials with respect to the process of discovering constitutional values 
or protecting fundamental rights,69 he contends that in the United States the 
authority of judicial review “is already distributed by history,” and it is 
currently settled that the Supreme Court holds the final interpretative 
authority.70 
D. Textualism and Originalism 
Textualism and originalism aim to bind the current public to the original 
constitutional course as plainly expressed in the words of the Constitution or 
understood by those who wrote the Constitution/the generation living at that 
period.71  All the approaches described above present themselves as emanating 
from the constitutional text, but textualism and originalism are more “text-
based” theories.72 
 
democracy and the rule of law “are rooted in a more fundamental ideal, that any acceptable 
government must treat people as equals”); see also Luna, supra note 64, at 824–25 (summarizing 
Dworkin’s position). 
 66. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133 (1977) (arguing that constitutional 
restraints “[can] be justified by appeal to moral rights which individuals possess against the 
majority”). 
 67. Dorf, supra note 64, at 143 (summarizing Dworkin’s position as being that, “legislation 
that denies persons equal respect is . . . inconsistent with constitutional democracy”). 
 68. See DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 153–55; DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 70 (“If we give up 
the idea that there is a canonical form of democracy, then we must also surrender the idea that 
judicial review is wrong because it inevitably compromises democracy.”). 
 69. See DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 7, 12, 34.  There seems to have been a shift in 
Dworkin’s position.  In his earlier writings, one can find indications that he believed courts were 
structurally the best institution for principled decision.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 
244 (1986). 
 70. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 2, 12, 33–35, 74. 
 71. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT. 427, 444–46 (2007) (describing the development of different versions of originalism: 
original intention, original understanding, and original meaning). 
 72. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 
535, 541–45 (1999) (distinguishing between text-based theories and practice-based theories, and 
positioning “originalism” in the former camp). 
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The CM difficulty captures the clash between the voice of “We the 
People” who produced the constitutional text and the voice of the current 
people and their representatives.  According to originalists and textualists, 
review of legislation is justified since in terms of democratic legitimacy, the 
original voice of the popular sovereign as fixed in the Constitution is superior 
to the current passing whims of public opinion.73  Judicial review is the best 
mechanism for ensuring loyalty to the people’s original voice, since the 
Justices possess expertise in the field of constitutional history or in textualist 
analysis.74 
E. Ackerman’s Dualist Model 
According to Bruce Ackerman’s dualist model, in times of normal politics, 
the Court’s CM role is justified because the CM judicial review power binds 
the People to their own constitutional principles that were ratified in times of 
“higher lawmaking.”75  In these relatively short periods of time of 
“constitutional politics,” constitutional changes are not necessarily made 
according to the formal procedure for amending the Constitution that is 
anchored in Article V.  Ackerman argues that the constitutional constraints of 
Article V compel the People to recruit sustained and enduring political energy 
to either amend the Constitution according to Article V or make a 
constitutional change transgressing its constraints.76  Only a significant 
mobilization of the People can muster enough force to change the 
achievements of pervious higher lawmaking power.77  Public support of such a 
change has to be qualitatively different from the support of normal legislation, 
 
 73.  Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & 
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 2, 7, 9, 42–44 (2011) 
(explaining the fixation thesis and the argument for originalism’s democratic legitimacy); 
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 276 (2009) 
(“Originalism is uniquely consistent with democratic government, they argue, because it ensures 
that judges will invalidate democratically enacted laws only when those laws conflict with the 
judgment of the supermajority that ratified the constitution.”). 
 74. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 8–9, 18 (1977). 
 75. ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 9–10. 
 76. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 4–5 (1998) (“The 
higher lawmaking system imposes specially rigorous tests upon political movements that hope to 
earn the heightened sense of democratic legitimacy awarded to spokesmen for We the People.”); 
ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 7, 10 (“Only after negotiating this more arduous obstacle course 
can a political elite earn the authority to say that We the People have changed our mind.”); id. at 
19 (recognizing “a deepening dialogue between leaders and masses within a democratic structure 
that finally succeeds in generating broad popular consent for a sharp break with the status quo”); 
id. at 27. 
 77. ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 10, 13, 48, 165, 184–85, 264–65; ACKERMAN, supra note 
76, at 6, 29. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] THE TWO COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTIES 349 
both in the degree of majority support and in the duration and depth of 
deliberation.78  After the period of “constitutional politics,” in times of “normal 
politics,” the Court’s role is to “translate the rare successes of constitutional 
politics into cogent doctrinal principles capable of controlling normal 
politics.”79 
Simple passing desires do not express the considered judgments of the 
people in their collective capacity.  These are mere public opinion, even when 
enacted into law.  As such, these desires should be constrained by the judicial 
review mechanism, which binds the people to their considered constitutional 
judgments.80  The political branches similarly cannot be allowed to stray from 
the constraints placed upon them by the people.81  Indeed, the Justices’ role “is 
to preserve the higher law solutions reached by the People against their erosion 
during periods of normal politics.”82  In such times, the Court “represents” the 
people, who are absent.83 
Ackerman thus justifies the Court’s CM authority based on its ability to 
preserve the people’s higher-law achievements, even those that were not 
formally codified.  But Ackerman’s model does more.  It also presents a 
mechanism for the dissolution, at least in some cases, of the CM difficulty in 
its literal sense.  In certain constitutional moments, “We the People” are able to 
break through the formal procedures of legality, and accord enduring public 
opinion a de-facto status of a constitutional amendment.  In other words, if the 
transformation in public opinion is enduring and strong enough, it can overturn 
judicial constitutional decisions which counter public opinion. 
According to Ackerman, the preservationist function is very suited for the 
Court, since it relies on judicial expertise in identifying extraordinary moments 
 
 78. Bruce Ackerman, The Political Case for Constitutional Courts, in LIBERALISM 
WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N. 
SHKLAR 205, 209–10 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996) (discussing depth, breadth, and decisiveness 
required to endow an initiative with special constitutional status). 
 79. ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 290; see also id. at 60 (“[The Court’s] job is to preserve 
the higher law solutions reached by the People against their erosion during periods of normal 
politics.”); id. at 72, 263–65; David M. Golove, Democratic Constitutionalism: The Bickel-
Ackerman Dialectic, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra 
note 20, at 71, 80–81. 
 80. See ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 242–43, 262–63. 
 81. Id. at 171 (“During periods of normal politics, [government officials] must be 
constrained by the constitutional forms imposed during rare periods of constitutional creativity, 
when the People mobilize and speak with a very different voice.”); id. at 261–64, 289. 
 82. Id. at 60; see also id. at 9–10, 72, 192, 263. 
 83. Id. at 264–65 (“[T]he Supreme Court is . . . an ongoing representative of a mobilized 
People during the lengthy periods of apathy, ignorance, and selfishness that mark the collective 
life of the private citizenry of a liberal republic.”). 
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of public mobilization (“constitutional politics”).84  “Quite simply,” he 
explains, “the Justices are the only ones around with the training and the 
inclination to look back to past moments of popular sovereignty, and to check 
the pretensions of our elected politicians when they endanger the great 
achievements of the past.”85 
III.  DISSOLVING THE CM DIFFICULTY IN ITS LITERAL SENSE 
A. Robert Dahl Plants the Seeds for Dissolving the Literal CM Difficulty 
In 1957, Robert Dahl published a revolutionary article.86  Dahl’s aim was 
to examine the empirical basis of what is arguably the most common 
justification for the Court’s CM authority: the claim that the Court “stands in 
some special way as a protection of minorities against tyranny by majorities.”87  
Based on empirical data, Dahl argued that Supreme Court decisions rarely 
obstruct important policies of national majorities.88  Dahl suggested that the 
Court acts in a CM fashion only during “short-lived transitional periods,” when 
the dominant political coalition is disintegrating or otherwise unstable.89  Most 
of the time, the appointment of Justices by Presidents who are part of dominant 
political coalition ensures that the Court’s decisions are in line with the will of 
lawmaking coalitions.90 
 
 84. See id. at 263–65; Golove, supra note 79, at 80–81. 
 85. Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1806–07 (2007); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 47, at 139 (“What the 
judges are especially equipped to do is preserve the achievements of popular sovereignty during 
the long periods of our public existence when the citizenry is not mobilized for great 
constitutional achievements.”). 
 86. Dahl, supra note 23.  While the idea that the Court, “with but few exceptions, adjusted 
itself in the long run to the dominant currents of public sentiment,” had already been suggested by 
DEAN ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL 40 (1937), or even by 1 JAMES 
BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 242–43 (1995) (1888), Dahl provided it with a firmer 
empirical basis.  See Pildes, supra note 3, at 114–15 (discussing the relation of Dahl’s work to 
that of Alfange); Adrian Vermeule, “Government by Public Opinion”: Bryce’s Theory of the 
Constitution 17 (Harvard Working Paper No. 11–13, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1809794 (“[I]t is Bryce, not Robert Dahl, who first clearly articulates the thesis that 
judges in some sense follow either current public opinion or the views of past political coalitions . 
. . .” (footnote omitted)).  For the revolutionary nature of Dahl’s article, see David Adamany & 
Stephen Meinhold, Robert Dahl: Democracy, Judicial Review, and the Study of Law and Courts, 
in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 361 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003). 
 87. Dahl, supra note 23, at 282; see also Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, The Easy Core Case 
for Judicial Review, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 227, 232 (2010) (noting that the rights-based 
justification is “perhaps the most popular and well entrenched in American legal thought”). 
 88. Id. at 283–84. 
 89. Id. at 293. 
 90. Adamany & Meinhold, supra note 86, at 362–63, 374 (discussing Dahl’s argument); 
Pildes, supra note 3, at 104–05 (“Dahl . . . concluded that the Supreme Court had not functioned 
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Following Dahl, other social scientists have shown a correlation between 
the Court’s constitutional decisions and the policy preferences of legislative 
majorities at the national level.91  Since the mid-1980s, social scientists have 
published studies that present a correlation between public opinion, as 
measured by polls, and the Court’s decisions on most publicly salient-issues.92  
In his comprehensive studies of the relationship between the Court’s decisions 
and public opinion, Thomas Marshall concluded that “[o]verall, the evidence 
suggests that the modern Court has been an essentially majoritarian 
institution.”93 
Until recently, however, constitutional theorists have largely focused on 
offering normative justifications for the Court’s CM authority.94  This has 
changed significantly during the last decade or so, as more and more legal 
theorists have come to realize the importance of social-science research to 
constitutional discourse.95  Thus, empirical findings have convinced many of 
them that over time, the Court’s decisions tend to reflect the majority’s opinion 
rather than thwart it.96 
 
historically as a countermajoritarian institution and, for structural reasons, was unlikely to do 
so.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Michael McCann, How the Supreme Court Matters in American Politics: New 
Institutionalist Perspectives, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW 
INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 63, 69 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999) 
(presenting the conventional wisdom among social scientists following Dahl’s article and its 
refinement as a result of further studies). 
 92. See, e.g., Adamany & Meinhold, supra note 86, at 372–73; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST 
DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 6 (2006) (“Beginning with Robert 
Dahl in the 1950s, political scientists have argued that the Supreme Court throughout its history 
has tended to follow national opinion rather than challenging it.”); Peretti, supra note 20, at 132 
(“Overall, the research refutes Bickel’s characterization of the Court as a countermajoritarian 
institution.”); Law, supra note 21, at 730 (“[E]mpirical studies suggest that the Court’s actions are 
at least as consistent with public opinion as those of the elected branches.”); David G. Barnum, 
The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 
47 J. POL. 652, 662 (1985); Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Popular Influence on Supreme 
Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711, 714–15, 718, 720 (1994); PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 37. 
 93. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 192–93 (1989) 
(“Where clear poll margins exist, three-fifths to two-thirds of Court rulings reflect the polls.”); see 
also id. at 7, 78–81, 97–98, 117; MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 4–5 (stating the modern Court 
appears to be as majoritarian as other American policy makers); id. at 35, 55–59. 
 94. See Pildes, supra note 3, at 104 (“For several decades, Bickel’s and Dahl’s warring 
perspectives remained largely cabined within their own respective disciplines.  Legal scholars 
continued to develop normative constitutional theories . . . .”). 
 95. See id. at 105 (describing how Dahl’s research and Bickel’s CM difficulty came in recent 
years into “more direct conversation and collision”). 
 96. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 92, at xii; BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: 
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 364–65 (2009) (“By the end of the Rehnquist Court, it was a widely 
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Scholars have suggested several mechanisms that might explain this 
correlation between the Court’s decisions and public opinion.  Before 
examining in detail each of these mechanisms, it is important to emphasize a 
property they share.  All of these mechanisms aim to dissolve the difficulty in 
its literal meaning, to demonstrate that the CM difficulty is a myth or an 
illusion and that the Court is in fact a majoritarian institution in the sense that 
its decisions correspond to majority opinion. 
B. Dissolution Mechanisms 
1. The Appointment Process 
Many scholars explain the correlation between the Court’s decisions and 
majority opinion by pointing to the judicial appointment process.97  This 
process allows the President and the Senate majority to control the Court’s 
composition.98  As Dahl first demonstrated empirically, the judicial 
appointment process ensures that the Court remains attuned to the dominant 
political coalition.99  Based on Dahl’s theory and subsequent empirical 
corroboration, several constitutional scholars have claimed that Dahl’s 
“dominant political coalition,” which controls the Court’s composition, serves 
as a proxy for the majority’s views.100  In this manner, the sync between public 
opinion and the Court’s decisions is ensured.101 
 
acknowledged fact that the Court was mirroring public opinion.”); id. at 382 (“What history 
shows is assuredly not that Supreme Court decisions always are in line with popular opinion, but 
rather that they come into line with one another over time.”); Peretti, supra note 20, at 123, 136, 
140 (“[T]he Court’s decisions match majority opinion more often than not and about as often as 
the other branches.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 3, at 139–40 (“Indeed, most majoritarians rely centrally on 
this mechanism to explain how the Court purportedly comes to reflect national political 
majorities.”); Peretti, supra note 20, at 132 (“Most scholars agree that the appointment process is 
the dominant path through which public opinion influences Supreme Court decisions and the best 
explanation for the majoritarian character of most Supreme Court decisions.”). 
 98. Dahl, supra note 23, at 285 (“[T]he policy views dominant on the Court are never for 
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United 
States.”). 
 99. Id. at 284–85. 
 100. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 55 (presenting updated empirical data supporting 
Dahl’s thesis); McCann, supra note 91, at 69 (“[C]onventional accounts suggest [that] the Court 
typically follows the policy agenda and preferences of legislative majorities at the national 
level . . . .”).  Contra e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 12, 42–44 (2007) (“Subsequent empirical analyses of Dahl’s thesis have generally 
failed to confirm his findings.”); Pildes, supra note 3, at 142–43 (“Dahl’s work, pathbreaking in 
1957, has not stood up over time.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 612 
(1993) (“Although federal judges are not elected, they are appointed by Presidents who stand for 
popular election.  Judicial appointments often mirror the popular will that elected a President.”); 
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For example, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson devised the theory of 
“Partisan Entrenchment.”102  “[B]y installing enough judges and Justices with 
roughly similar ideological views over time,” they suggest, “Presidents can 
push constitutional doctrine in directions they prefer.”103  The controlling 
elected coalition determines the appointments, and thus “the Supreme Court 
tends, in the long run, to cooperate with the dominant political forces of the 
day.”104  In this manner, responsiveness to the opinion of the electing public is 
indirectly created.105  “Justices resemble Senators who are appointed for 18-
year terms by their parties and never have to face election.”106  Partisan 
entrenchment is “roughly but imperfectly democratic,” thus dissolving the CM 
difficulty in its literal sense.107 
Other scholars, however, claim that this proxy is only a crude one, and can 
hardly create a prefect calibration between public opinion and the Court.108  
Presidents usually do not appoint Justices who capture mainstream popular 
thought, and even Justices appointed as “perfect proxy for public opinion” may 
experience “ideological drift” during their term of service on the bench.109  
Moreover, in view of the large number of issues adjudicated by the Court and 
the length of time necessary to replace a substantial number of Justices, 
 
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 53, at 148 (contending that today, electoral responsiveness in 
Supreme Court appointments follows de-facto from the politicization of the nomination and 
confirmation processes); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, 
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1030–31 (2004) (“Because 
Article III lodges the composition of the federal judiciary in the political control of the President 
and the Senate, no judicial interpretation of the Constitution can withstand the mobilized, 
enduring, and determined opposition of the people.  Even Justice Antonin Scalia concedes that 
‘the appointment and confirmation process will’ ensure the ultimate influence of popular 
opinion.”). 
 102. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006). 
 103. Id. at 490; see also id. at 501 (“If the Court as a whole strays too often and too widely 
from the desires of the dominant forces in national politics . . . the appointment process soon 
pushes the Court back into line.  The calibration is hardly perfect . . . .”); Jack M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1068 
(2001) (“Partisan entrenchment through presidential appointments to the judiciary is the best 
account of how the meaning of the Constitution changes over time through Article III 
interpretation rather than through Article V amendment.”). 
 104. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 102, at 490; see also id. at 495, 501. 
 105. Id. at 501. 
 106. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 103, at 1067. 
 107. Id. at 1076 (“[P]artisan entrenchment . . . is in some sense the opposite of Alexander 
Bickel’s famous ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ . . . .”). 
 108. See, e.g., Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in Constitutional Adjudication, 13 
REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 12 (2007). 
 109. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 374. 
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appointment of Justices is not an effective way to ensure the responsiveness of 
the Court to public opinion.110 
In light of this criticism, several scholars have pointed out that the 
confirmation process has changed dramatically over the last forty years.  In the 
past, confirmation hearings were not generally on the public’s agenda, and 
mass public opinion thus had almost no role in the process.111  In recent 
decades, the confirmation process has become like an electoral campaign, with 
public opinion serving as “the implicit gauge of selection and confirmation.”112  
Hence, the Court’s responsiveness to public opinion is ensured also through 
public opinion’s direct control of the appointment process.113 
2. Strategic Behavior and Attitudinal Change 
Rather than invoking a mediating mechanism by which majority opinion 
influences the Court, several social scientists have suggested a direct link 
between majority opinion and the Court’s decisions.114  Both the strategic 
behavior and the attitudinal change explanations, described below, suggest that 
the Justices internalize majority opinion into their own way of thinking. 
The strategic explanation portrays Justices as strategic players, who 
modify their behavior in light of public opinion and the behavior of other 
majoritarian political players, in order to protect the Court’s enduring public 
 
 110. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 193 (1990). 
 111. RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION 
PROCESS 10–11 (2005) (arguing that Supreme Court nominations have been highly public 
processes from the late 1960s, and even more so since the 1980s); id. at 29 (“Until the last quarter 
century or so, the public’s role was minimal in Supreme Court confirmations.”); BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 174–75 (2006). 
 112. DAVIS, supra note 111, at 16 (“[P]ublic opinion surveys and other less scientific 
measures . . . become tools for proponents and opponents in justifying appointment or 
rejection.”); see also id. at 6–9 (“The similarities between presidential elections and judicial 
appointments are becoming increasingly apparent.”); id. at 29–31, 61–64, 75–76, 102–03; JAMES 
L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY 
THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 1 (2009) (“Today, one of the crucial 
elements in confirmations strategies concerns how public opinion will be managed and 
manipulated. . . . [A]t least since the days of the Bork defeat and Thomas victory, the preferences 
of the mass public have been influential in determining who goes on the Supreme Court.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Law, supra note 21, at 728 (“[I]t is impossible to deny that the composition of 
the Supreme Court . . . is the product of pitched struggle among political actors who pay very 
close attention to the substantive views of judicial nominees.”). 
 114. See, e.g., William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 96–98 (1993); Micheal W. Giles, Bethany Blackstone & Richard L. 
Vining, Jr., The Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages between 
Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70 J. POL. 293, 300, 303 (2008). 
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support (sociological legitimacy) and policy effectiveness.115  According to 
this theory, Justices worry that a decline in the Court’s enduring public support 
would lead to poor implementation of the Court’s decisions, backlash, and 
other negative consequences.  To avoid such a decline, the Justices remain, to 
some degree, responsive to public opinion.116 
The attitudinal model suggests that the Justices make result-oriented 
decisions, based primarily on their ideologies.  The Justices’ ideologies, in 
turn, are shaped by factors similar to those shaping the ideological preferences 
of the public and its representatives.  To the extent that the Justices share the 
public’s ideological preferences, they will vindicate public opinion without 
even intending to do so.  Political socialization ensures that the Court’s 
adjudication does not stray too far from the views of the general public and its 
representatives, and a shift in public opinion is usually reflected by a parallel 
shift in Justices’ ideology.117  After surveying recent studies that examine 
public influence on the Court, Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin have concluded 
that both the strategic behavior model and attitudinal change model are 
“equally plausible.”118 
3. Backlash Theories 
According to Barry Friedman, as history demonstrates, the correlation 
between public opinion and the Court’s decisions is driven, to a large extent, 
by public backlash.119  Public backlash, as Cass Sunstein elaborates, is the 
“[i]ntense and sustained public disapproval of a judicial ruling, accompanied 
 
 115. See, e.g., Giles, Blackstone & Vining, supra note 114, at 294–95; LEE EPSTEIN & JACK 
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 11–12 (1998). 
 116. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum & Neil Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, 
Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1546–47 (2010) (describing the mechanism of 
“legitimacy as a source of responsiveness to public opinion”); see also id. at 1563–65, 1580; Neal 
Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 75 (2004) 
(“Lacking the power to appropriate funds or command the military, the Court understands that it 
must act in a way that garners public acceptance.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of 
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 265–67, 278–79 (1997); Giles, 
Blackstone & Vining, supra note 114, at 295; Baum & Devins, supra note 116, at 1520–22 
(“[T]he Justices have made clear that they are not immune from the social and political forces that 
surround them.”); id. at 1557, 1560–63. 
 118. Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? 
Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 280–81 (2010) (arguing that 
it is equally plausible that “the public has a direct influence on the Court because the Justices are 
concerned about their legitimacy in the short and long-terms . . . [or that] the same things that 
influence public opinion may influence the Justices, who are, after all, members of the public 
too”). 
 119. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 362 (“One of the greatest engines of constitutional change 
has been mobilization against Supreme Court decisions by those unhappy with the results.”). 
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by aggressive steps to resist that ruling and to remove its legal force.”120  If a 
backlash movement “muster[s] strong support, then, and only then,” Friedman 
explains, “the Court tends to fall into line with the dissenting opinion.”121  
Thus, social mobilization is another mechanism that ensures that the Court is 
ultimately responsive to public’s views.122 
The alignment between the Rehnquist Court’s decisions and public opinion 
posed a challenge for both the appointment mechanism and the backlash 
mechanism.123  The eleven-year period from 1994 and 2005 was the longest 
the Court had gone without a change in membership since the Court’s size was 
fixed at nine Justices in 1869.124  In addition, no serious public backlash 
occurred in those years, and the other two branches’ “weapons to control the 
justices look to have been ruled off the table or lost their force.”125  Yet, the 
Court in this period was more in line with public opinion than ever before.126 
In light of this conundrum, Barry Friedman has recently presented a theory 
of “quiet equilibrium,” or “marriage” between the Court and public opinion.127  
According to Friedman, the Court has always been attentive to public opinion, 
but only recently, after more than two hundred years, have the public and the 
Court understood how to interact with each other effectively.128  Today, “[t]he 
justices don’t actually have to get into trouble before retribution occurs; they 
can sense trouble and avoid it.”129 
The “quiet equilibrium” mechanism, by which Friedman explains the 
current sync between the Court and public opinion,130 is a variation on the 
 
 120. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING 
DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 125 (2009). 
 121. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 383. 
 122. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 8, 96–97 (2011). 
 123. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 354 (“From the first Rehnquist Court right down to the 
third, most, if not all, of the major decisions could be seen as keeping within the mainstream of 
popular opinion.”). 
 124. Pildes, supra note 3, at 141 (“[T]hree of the five longest periods between vacancies since 
the Court went to nine members have occurred in the last thirty years.”). 
 125. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 376; see also Pildes, supra note 3, at 139 (“The political 
branches today are less likely effectively to resist the Court.”). 
 126. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 358–59, 371, 376 (“Perhaps more than ever before, 
Supreme Court decisions run in the mainstream of public opinion.”). 
 127. Id. at 376. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.; see also Barry Friedman, The Will of the People and the Process of Constitutional 
Change, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (2010) (“[I]f the system is in equilibrium, little will 
be observed in the way of overt struggle.”). 
 130. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 376. 
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backlash mechanism.  It emphasizes the fear from an anticipated public 
reaction rather than its actual occurrence.131 
4. Public Opinion as a Legitimate Legal Argument 
According to Richard Primus’s description, in certain areas of law, strong 
public opinion is incorporated into legal discourse as a legitimate source of 
constitutional interpretation, even without going through the formal democratic 
process and even without a threat of public backlash.132  In these areas the only 
relevant question is whether public opinion is “strong” enough.133  Thus, in 
Primus’s picture of constitutional law, the line separating between public 
opinion and the legal language disappears completely: Public opinion is 
incorporated into legal language.134  A strong argument in terms of public 
opinion will be considered as persuasive in terms of constitutional law.135 
Similarly, David Strauss points out the Court’s attempt, “over the last 
generation or so,” to “anticipate[] . . . developments in popular opinion” and to 
adjudicate accordingly.136  He labels this trend “modernization.”137  “[I]nstead 
of facing down popular majorities,” as would be expected from a court 
adjudicating literally in a CM fashion, in certain areas the Court “yields when 
it finds out that it has misgauged public opinion.”138  Strauss demonstrates that 
several of the Court’s recent judgments were consciously tailored to coincide 
with trends in popular opinion.139  Utilizing provisions in the Constitution 
which allow a great deal of interpretative latitude, the Court is able to 
invalidate a “statute if it no longer reflects popular opinion or if the trends in 
popular opinion are running against it.”140  It is also able to change course, 
upholding statutes “that the court previously struck down—if it becomes 
apparent that popular sentiment has moved in a different direction from what 
the court anticipated.”141 
 
 131. See id. 
 132. Primus, supra note 108, at 6, 8–9, 18–19. 
 133. Id. at 20 (“[I]n cases where strong public opinion bore on the question, judges would err 
if they arrived at their conclusions without reference to that opinion.”). 
 134. Id. at 11, 19–20. 
 135. Id. at 8, 14. 
 136. Strauss, supra note 61, at 859–60 (“[O]ver the last generation or so, a very different form 
of judicial review has quietly emerged—an approach that, more or less consciously, looks to the 
future, not the past; that tries to bring laws up to date, rather than deferring to tradition; and that 
anticipates and accommodates, rather than limits, developments in popular opinion.”). 
 137. Id. at 860. 
 138. Id. at 859–60 (“This approach, which might be called modernization, has not been fully 
avowed by the Supreme Court, and it does not characterize every area of constitutional law.  But 
it is the dominant approach in many important areas . . . .”). 
 139. See, e.g., id. at 864–87. 
 140. Id. at 861. 
 141. Id. 
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One important implication of “keeping the content of constitutional law 
aligned with the public’s strongly held views” is the dissolution of the CM 
difficulty in its literal sense.142  In Strauss’s view, the rise of the 
“modernization” as “a central theme in constitutional law” serves perhaps as a 
“response to the relentless criticism of judicial review as antidemocratic.”143  
This mechanism ensures that “judicial review has, in principle, a more 
comfortable place in democratic government.”144 
C. What is Left of the CM Difficulty? 
Several dissolution theorists have suggested that since the CM difficulty is 
dissolved, constitutional scholars should cease to invest their time in 
confronting it.145  In their view, there is no difficulty with judicial review as 
long as it is responsive—over the long run—to public opinion.146  But even if 
one accepts that the mechanisms described above make the Court by and large 
responsive to public opinion, the second traditional CM difficulty remains un-
dissolved.  The Court may be responsive to the public and the elected 
branches, but as long as it is not accountable to them, the CM difficulty in its 
traditional sense is not dissolved.147  The Justices are not elected, and thus are 
not responsible to the electorate in the way legislators are. 
Rule by the electorate is something different from rule in accordance with 
the electorate’s views.  When people go and vote they intend to influence the 
elections and through it the elected institutions, but in expressing their attitudes 
in public polls, especially regarding the Court, they have no such intention.  
Thus, even if opinion polls guarantee that the public’s views are tracked 
 
 142. Primus, supra note 108, at 10. 
 143. Strauss, supra note 61, at 860–61. 
 144. Id. at 861. 
 145. See Friedman, supra note 129, at 1234 (“[T]he one suggestion . . . with which I 
vigorously disagree is Professor Primus’s notion that the countermajoritarian difficulty should 
nonetheless be retained as a heuristic . . . . [O]n this one point I believe he is misguided.”); Pildes, 
supra note 3, at 105 (arguing that some constitutional theorists “sought to dissolve Bickel’s 
question or suggest that it is naive and passé”); Peretti, supra note 20, at 137 (arguing that the CM 
difficulty is “a straw-man argument if there ever was one”). 
 146. BALKIN, supra note 122, at 71 (“What gives the system of judicial review its legitimacy, 
in other words, is its responsiveness—over the long run—to society’s competing views about 
what the Constitution means.”). 
 147. Cf. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 19 (“[O]ne may infer that judicial review, although not 
responsible, may have ways of being responsive.”); PERRY, supra note 31, at 31 (“What is crucial 
about majoritarian policymaking, unlike constitutional policymaking by the Supreme Court, is 
that policy decisions are made by those accountable, even if not always responsive, to electoral 
majorities. . . . What is crucial is electoral accountability, not degree of responsiveness to majority 
sentiments.”). 
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accurately, that is different from the people being in control.148  To dissolve the 
difficulty in its traditional sense, which focuses on accountability rather than 
on majoritarianism, one would need to demonstrate that the Court is 
responsible to the electorate, and thus that the people themselves are in 
control.149 
The Court can be considered to be indirectly accountable to the public 
through the appointment process, since it is administrated by elected 
representatives.150  Other mechanisms, such as impeaching Justices or slashing 
the Court’s budget, can also be understood to create indirect accountability.151  
Moreover, some view responsiveness as “a measure of how much 
accountability an institutional structure permits.”152  According to this view, 
the scholarly effort that exposes the Court’s responsiveness to elected 
representatives and to the general public shows that the Justices are subject to 
their control.153  Indeed, the dissolution theorists have tried to show that 
Justices, much like elected representatives, adhere to public opinion, thus 
exposing mechanisms of accountability without elections.154  Similarly, 
dissolution theorists conceptualize congressional opposition and presidential 
pressures155 as mechanisms that ensure that the Court will be somewhat 
accountable to elected representatives.156  These manifestations of discontent 
by politicians may also serve as signals for the Court on its waning public 
confidence, and thus can ensure indirectly accountability to the public.157  As 
 
 148. DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 76 
(2008). 
 149. See id. at 76–77. 
 150. See Yingling, supra note 10, at 106–07; EISGRUBER, supra note 60, at 4 (“Though the 
justices are not chosen by direct election, they are nevertheless selected through a process that is 
both political and democratic. . . . The justices have . . . a democratic pedigree . . . .”). 
 151. See CHOPER, supra note 34, at 47–55 (discussing the political accountability of the 
Supreme Court). 
 152. John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political 
Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 34, at 
131, 131. 
 153. See id. at 133–34. 
 154. See, e.g., Baum & Devins, supra note 116, at 1562–63 (“If the Justices respond 
frequently to what they perceive as direct pressure from the general public, then they are 
fundamentally similar to elected officials in their accountability to public opinion.”); Waldron, 
supra note 35, at 43 (“Judicial review, it may be said, is a form of democratic representation, 
albeit a rather indirect form.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political 
Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 373 (1992) (noting that in times of intense congressional “hostility,” 
the Court retreated). 
 156. Seidman, supra note 33, at 1572 (surveying different mechanisms that make the Court 
accountable). 
 157. See TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 18–20, 257–67 (2011). 
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opposed to Bickel’s formal accountability through elections, these scholars 
point to accountability through politics.158 
However, the traditional version of the difficulty captures an additional 
important aspect of self-government.  The ability to remove representatives 
whose performance is deemed unsatisfactory is a crucial aspect of direct 
control over representatives.159  In the absence of an agreed upon justification 
for judicial review, in the absence of an agreed-upon “moral compass” for 
society to follow, one way to ensure that the Court will not stray from the 
“right” course is to subject those who decide to the control of the people.160  
This aspect has special importance in societies where the public is less 
politically active.  In such societies, the public will be less engaged in daily 
monitoring of its representatives and in forming opinions on political issues.  
Public support levels are less relevant and more weight is given to delegation 
of political power from the citizenry to its elected representatives and hence to 
the ability to replace these representatives.161  This aspect of accountability 
received special emphasis with regards to experts in the field of economics 
after the 2008 financial collapse.162 
The ability to remove representatives is a built-in feature of the system that 
has both an instrumental value, in that it promotes responsiveness, and an 
intrinsic value, in that it allows the public to determine its representatives at 
regular intervals.163  Hence, rather than misconceiving accountability as merely 
means to achieve responsiveness to the majority will, we should understand it 
also as a structural feature, a check against abuses of power.164  But the 
 
 158. See Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to 
Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 361, 362–63 (2008). 
 159. See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Introduction to REPRESENTATION 9 (Hanna Fenichel Pitkin 
ed., 1969) (describing the scholarly view that “[w]hat defines representation is not an act of 
authorization that initiates it, but an act of holding-to-account that terminates it.”); HENRY J. 
FORD, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 158 (1924) (arguing that “to establish a representative 
system all the following conditions are essential: 1. That the people shall be free to choose whom 
they will to represent them . . . 4. That elections shall be confined to the choice of 
representatives.”). 
 160. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 284–85 (3d 
ed. 1950) (“Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing 
the men who are to rule them.”); see also Somin, supra note 21, at 1298; Manin, Przeworski & 
Stokes, supra note 34, at 13 (“Under democracy, people invest governments with the power to 
rule because they can remove them.”). 
 161. See MATTHEW R. CLEARY & SUSAN C. STOKES, DEMOCRACY AND THE CULTURE OF 
SKEPTICISM: POLITICAL TRUST IN ARGENTINA AND MEXICO 3 (2006). 
 162. See, e.g., IAN SHAPIRO, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 18–19 (2011) 
(discussing the pressure to subject the architects of the economic system to “new regimes of 
accountability” in view of the dire results of the economic crisis). 
 163. See Waldron, supra note 35, at 37–38. 
 164. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 531, 535 (1998). 
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Justices are answerable to no outside source.165  As opposed to most influential 
appointed officials, Justices are hardly subject to removal by the political 
branches.166  The lack of this “majority control” over Supreme Court Justices 
will remain as long as the public cannot have some measure of control at 
regular intervals over the identity of the judicial decision-makers.167  The 
process designed to create such control is popular elections.168  
Notwithstanding the imperfections of elections as a mechanism of democratic 
accountability,169 in their absence, even a fully responsive Court does not 
dissolve the CM difficulty in its traditional sense.170  Thus, in some sense, the 
traditional CM difficulty is insoluble unless the public elects its Justices or has 
another mechanism to truly hold them accountable.171 
Hence, while scholars have concluded that “[c]ompared with the electoral 
control over legislatures, judges may not seem so relatively unaccountable,”172 
and that Congress “is the new ‘deviant institution in American democracy,’”173 
 
 165. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 438 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“There is no 
power above them to controul any of their decisions.  There is no authority that can remove them, 
and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature.  In short, they are independent of the 
people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven.”); see also id. at 442; Shlomo 
Slonim, Federalist No. 78 and Brutus’ Neglected Thesis on Judicial Supremacy, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 7, 15–17, 30–31 (2006) (explaining Brutus’ objection to judicial supremacy). 
 166. CHOPER, supra note 34, at 56 (presenting the “sharp contrast” between the Justices and 
“highly placed and greatly influential” appointed officials in terms of accountability). 
 167. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 38 (2005). 
 168. See Friedman, supra note 101, at 588–89. 
 169. See, e.g., id. at 582–88, 609–10 (claiming that elections “do not appear to guarantee 
accountability,” and concluding that Justices are unaccountable “only in the most formalistic and 
unanalytic of senses”); Manin, Przeworski & Stokes, supra note 34, at 50 (arguing that elections 
are not a sufficient mechanism to ensure citizens’ control over politicians). 
 170. CHOPER, supra note 34, at 58 (“That a majority of the people may ultimately prevail vis-
à-vis the Court by outright resistance or through methods of dubious legitimacy under a rule of 
law, even if a reality, is not the same as their ordained ability to change the composition of the 
political branches at regularly scheduled periodic elections.”). 
 171. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on 
Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1214, 1231 (1984) 
(arguing that no theory can reconcile judicial review with democratic theory since judicial review 
is CM by definition). 
 172. Friedman, supra note 101, at 611; see also CHOPER, supra note 34, at 16–25 (presenting 
the claim that the national lawmaking process is “anything but a system that simply articulates 
some readily identifiable popular will”). 
 173. Graber, supra note 158, at 362 (using Bickel’s famous dictum regarding the Court in 
summarizing Mann & Ornstein’s work The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America 
and How to Get It Back on Track). 
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at the end of the day, a core right to self-government is inevitably lost when an 
unelected Court exercises the authority of judicial review.174 
IV.  BICKEL AND THE TWO CM DIFFICULTIES 
As explained above, Bickel did not distinguish between the two 
difficulties.  However, he was not focused solely on devising a normative 
justification for the Court’s judicial review authority, as were many legal 
scholars.175  Instead, Bickel was also occupied with the threat to the Court’s 
public support.176  He did not attempt to show that the Court is a majoritarian 
institution in the sense that it follows public opinion.  But he was occupied 
with the question of what will happen to the Court if it decides against public 
opinion.177 
According to Bickel, the Court is a unique institution in that “insofar as is 
humanly possible,” it “is concerned only with principle” and not with 
“electoral responsibility.”178  He portrayed the Justices as having “the leisure, 
the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar,” offering a 
“sober second thought” in their task to pronounce and guard “the enduring 
values of a society” as opposed to the shifting and short-term public sentiments 
to which the legislature is responsive.179  Thus, the Court is not a mere register 
of public opinion; it serves as a leader of public opinion, a teacher in a national 
seminar, where “conversations between the Court and the people and their 
representatives” take place.180  This vital and otherwise unfulfilled function of 
 
 174. See Waldron, supra note 31, at 1394 (“[T]he issue is comparative, and these credentials 
are not remotely competitive with the democratic credentials of elected legislators.”). 
 175. See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 
1567, 1573 (1985). 
 176. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 68 (explaining that the Court needs to consider both principle 
and expediency); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS 90–91 (1970) (stressing the need for  “widespread assent” for implementing the 
Court’s judgments); Christopher J. Peters & Neal Devins, Alexander Bickel and the New Judicial 
Minimalism, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra 
note 20, at 45, 51 (noting that Bickel recognized that “[t]he Court could not then simply impose 
its judgments upon an unwilling populace; those judgments had instead to earn acceptance, if not 
immediately then over time”); KAHN, supra note 62, at 143 (“Instead of seeking to take the Court 
out of politics, [Bickel] hoped to solve the countermajoritarian difficulty by frankly recognizing 
the majoritarian basis of the Court’s work.”). 
 177. See Kronman, supra note 175, at 1585–86. 
 178. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 25–26, 68–69; see also PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM 
IN ITS PLACE 146 & n.4 (2005) (discussing the notion of the Court as the forum of reason). 
 179. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 27–24; see also KAHN, supra note 62, at 144 (discussing 
Bickel’s theory); Friedman, supra note 101, at 579. 
 180. BICKEL, supra note 176, at 91; BICKEL, supra note 1, at 26 (“The Justices, in Dean 
Rostow’s phrase, ‘are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 
239. 
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offering a sober and principled second thought is Bickel’s justification for CM 
judicial review.181 
In addition to this attempt to justify the Court’s CM authority, Bickel also 
focused on confronting dangers that stem from the CM difficulty in its literal 
sense.  As both Bickel and Paul Mishkin recognized, legal discourse follows 
the logic of professional reason, whereas popular discourse follows the logic of 
symbolism.182  For example, the logic of legal discourse requires consistency 
with existing precedents.  This requirement seems much less important to the 
public.183  In other words, principled arguments that are persuasive in legal 
terms are not necessarily persuasive in the public discourse.  Since the intrinsic 
merit of a legal position is hardly a guarantee of public support, the Court at 
times confronts the dilemma of whether to decide salient cases against the 
directives of legal doctrine in order to avoid unpopular decisions (decisions 
that are CM in the literal sense). 
The Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson184 exemplifies that fidelity to 
legal doctrine and legal principles alone may not always secure public support.  
The Court held that burning the American flag was an act of political dissent 
and hence a protected expression under the First Amendment.185  
Subsequently, the State of Texas could not criminalize such act.186  As Akhil 
Amar writes, the Court’s decision “was plainly right, and even easy—indeed, 
as right and easy a case in modern constitutional law as any I know.”187  
 
 181. See Stanley C. Brubaker, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: Tradition Versus Original 
Meaning, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra 
note 20, at 105, 106; Peretti, supra note 20, at 124 (arguing that Bickel’s special justification for 
“this deviant institution” is “its unique capacity for reasoned elaboration of principle”). 
 182. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term—Foreword: The High Court, the 
Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62–63 (1965) (“[T]his 
symbolic view of courts is a major factor in securing respect for, and obedience to, judicial 
decisions.”); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral 
Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
1473, 1484–85, 1497, 1506 (2007). 
 183. See James L. Gibson, Public Images and Understandings of Courts, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 828, 849 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 
2010) (“Perhaps the most surprising finding in these data is the relatively small weight that 
Americans give to respecting existing Supreme Court decisions (only 37.3% rate it as very 
important).”). 
 184. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 185. Id. at 399, 420. 
 186. Id. at 418–20. 
 187. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 124, 125 (1992); see also Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Sacred Flag and the First 
Amendment, 66 IND. L.J. 511, 547 (1991) (“Johnson is an easy case if well-established first 
amendment principles are applied to it.”); Norman Dorsen, Flag Desecration in Courts, 
Congress, and Country, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 417, 439 (2000) (“It may be true, as scholars 
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However, from the perspective of public support, the holding that flag burning 
was a constitutionally protected act had obvious potential to stir a harsh public 
response.188 
The decision received wide media coverage189 and “was met with virtual 
hysteria—by the people, in the press, and in the Congress.”190  A large 
majority of the public, 73%, disagreed with the decision.191  One commentator 
argued, “no Supreme Court decision in recent memory, if ever, was so quickly, 
bitterly, and overwhelmingly denounced by the American public and political 
establishment.”192  Following the Johnson decision and the Webster decision 
on abortion,193 there was a “dramatic drop” in public confidence in the 
Court.194 
In reaction to the Johnson decision, Congress passed the Flag Protection 
Act.195  In June 1990, the Court in U.S. v. Eichman followed its reasoning in 
Johnson and invalidated the Act as an unconstitutional restraint on free 
 
have written, that Texas v. Johnson is an ‘easy case’ and ‘obvious.’” (footnote omitted)).  Contra 
Paul F. Campos, Advocacy and Scholarship, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 820–25 (1993) (criticizing 
the Court’s reasoning and Amar’s claim that the case was an easy one). 
 188. See Peter Hanson, Flag Burning, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY, supra note 37, at 184, 185. 
 189. Anke Grosskopf & Jeffery J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme Court 
Decisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the 
Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 633, 638–39 (1998) (examining the wide coverage of the 
decision by the major television networks and the New York Times); see also Hanson, supra note 
188, at 185 (“[P]olls taken immediately after the decision show high levels of awareness to the 
case and overwhelming public opposition to the Court’s decision.”); id. at 198–99 (examining 
media coverage). 
 190. Dorsen, supra note 187, at 424 (“[W]hat may be true as a matter of constitutional 
principle is often not accepted by the public.”); see also Hanson, supra note 188, at 198 
(“Immediately after Texas v. Johnson, flag burning was thought to be the most important of four 
major policy issues in a Gallup survey.”). 
 191. Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 189, at 642–43, 651–52; see also Hanson, supra note 
188, at 185–86 (“[P]olls taken immediately after the decision show high levels of awareness of 
the case and overwhelming public opposition to the Court’s decision.”). 
 192. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, BURNING THE FLAG: THE GREAT 1989–1990 AMERICAN 
FLAG DESECRATION CONTROVERSY 113 (1996). 
 193. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 499 (1989) (upholding constitutionality 
of a statute banning the use of public facilities and public employees for the performance of 
abortions not necessary to save the life of the mother). 
 194. Grosskopf & Mondak, supra note 189, at 641–42 (“Circumstantially, the data suggest 
that Webster and Texas v. Johnson profoundly affected public confidence in the Supreme Court. . 
. . Functionally, confidence in the Supreme Court reached rock bottom in July and August of 
1989.”).  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), was announced on June 21, 1989, and Webster 
v. Reproductive Health, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), followed on July 3. 
 195. The Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (2006), invalidated by United States v. 
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
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speech.196  Once again, polls showed that the vast majority of the American 
public rejected the decision.197  The decision in Eichman vividly demonstrates 
the Bickelian dilemma.  The Court had to choose between adhering strictly to 
the standards of professional legal reasoning, even at the price of going against 
public opinion, or instead corrupting its principled, professional language in 
order to resolve the case in a manner suitable for public digestion.198  Bickel 
realized that in face of serious popular resistance, the Court may choose the 
latter option.  Saving its public support, the Court would lose its ability to 
serve as the forum of principle and thus its justification for judicial review.199  
Hence, he suggested that the Court use prudential justiciability doctrines to 
dismiss certain cases, thus avoiding the corruption of the legal language.200  
These “passive virtues” allow the Court to avoid cases in which preserving the 
standards of legal expertise would harm its public support.201 
Thus, Bickel was the first to structure a court-centric theory of judicial 
review—i.e., one featuring “a highly strategic Supreme Court” that is 
interested in preserving the quality and efficacy of its decisions as well as its 
public support.202  But he did not portray the Court as an institution 
controlled—in deciding substantive issues—by considerations such as 
preserving its public support as an institution.203  On the contrary, the passive-
virtues technique aims precisely to save the Court from such a grim destiny.  
Thus, when the Court decides a volatile case on its merits, rather than use the 
passive virtues, Bickel insisted that it must make a fully principled decision.204  
 
 196. 496 U.S. at 317–18. 
 197. Hanson, supra note 188, at 185–86. 
 198. See Post & Siegel, supra note 182, at 1487–88, 1496–97 (explaining that Mishkin found 
this tension “unresolveable”). 
 199. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 258. 
 200. Id. at 69–71. 
 201. Id. at 58, 69–71 (explaining that passive virtues are “the secret” of the Court’s ability “to 
maintain itself in the tension between principle and expediency”); see id. at 95–96, 205.  Contra 
KAHN, supra note 62, at 146 (“[Bickel] converts the Court into a political institution that cannot 
claim a privileged place for law.”). 
 202. Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of Law 
or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 107 (2010) (“[Bickel’s passive] virtues featured a highly 
strategic Supreme Court.  Knowing where it actually wanted to come out on some of the great 
issues of the day, it self-consciously chose to take, or more to the point, reject certain cases 
because they didn’t present the best vehicle for winning popular support because the timing just 
wasn’t right.”); Peters & Devins, supra note 176, at 50, 58 (noting that the Court’s strategy was 
“an approach motivated by juricentrism—by a desire to preserve the Court’s position as a coequal 
institution with inherent importance in the constitutional scheme”). 
 203. See Peters & Devins, supra note 176, at 45–46. 
 204. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 69 (“When it strikes down legislative policy, the Court must act 
rigorously on principle, else it undermines the justification for its power.”); id. at 199–200; see 
also Mark Tushnet, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Regimes: Alexander Bickel and Cass 
Sunstein, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
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The Court’s role and its raison d’être is after all, in his view, to decide cases in 
a principled manner.205 
However, only on rare occasions should the Court act contrary to public 
opinion and endorse controversial principles, acting then as both a “shaper and 
prophet of the opinion that will prevail and endure.”206  In order not to lose its 
public support, the Court must pick these occasions carefully.  There is a limit 
to the number of principles pronounced by the Justices contrary to public 
opinion that the public is willing to tolerate and that the political institutions 
are willing to execute.  In Gerald Gunther’s words, Bickel insisted that the 
Court be one hundred percent principled twenty percent of the time.207  A 
Court that does not adhere to this limit will soon discover that its decisions are 
not executed and its institutional survival is endangered.  In view of this 
danger, the Court “labors under the obligation to succeed,” and to do so, “in a 
rather immediate foreseeable future.”208 
At the end of the day, with neither sword nor purse, the Court, according to 
Bickel, has only public confidence that is based both on its “mystic prestige” 
and on society’s “readiness to receive principle from the Court.”209  Thus, 
Bickel’s story ends on a sad note.  In a later work, he wrote that he had “come 
to doubt in many instances the Court’s capacity to develop ‘durable 
principles,’ and to doubt, therefore, that judicial supremacy can work and is 
tolerable in broad areas of social policy.”210 
 
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra 
note 20, at 23, 26; Peters & Devins, supra note 176, at 58–59, 61. 
 205. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 188. 
 206. Id. at 239. 
 207. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle 
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964). 
 208. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 239.  (“The Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of 
it, but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its own . . . .”); see BICKEL , supra note 176, at 94–
95; Introduction, Arthur Garfield Hays Conference: The Proper Role of the United States 
Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 457, 476 (1964) (“[A] court that 
decided the equivalent of five cases such as Brown v. Board of Educ. in a single year would have 
seen the end of the institution, I am sure.” (footnote omitted)); Golove, supra note 79, at 83. 
 209. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 204, 252; see also BICKEL, supra note 176, at 94 (“The Court’s 
effectiveness, it is often remarked, depends substantially on confidence, on what is called 
prestige.”). 
 210. BICKEL, supra note 176, at 99.  For a description of the change in Bickel’s view, see J. 
Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 769, 780–83 (1971); Robert F. Nagel, Principle, Prudence, and Judicial Power, in THE 
JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN 
DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 9, 14.  Contra 
Kronman, supra note 175, at 1568 (“Bickel did in fact have a political philosophy that remained 
unchanged throughout his career, a consistent outlook that connects all of his most important 
ideas on the role of the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
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V.  VISIBLE CASES 
The CM difficulty in its literal sense is restricted to high-salience issues.  
No viable public opinion is likely to emerge on low-salience issues.  Thus, the 
Court cannot decide cases in a literally CM manner on issues that are obscure 
to the public.211  Only in relatively few cases that deal with salient issues and 
receive media coverage can the literal CM difficulty emerge.212 
The media has a prominent role in determining which cases will become 
CM in the literal sense.  First, since, as Chief Justice Earl Warren noted, “the 
public cannot be expected to read the opinions themselves [and] must depend 
on newspapers, periodicals, radio, and television for its information,” a case 
cannot become visible to the public without media coverage.213  Second, media 
coverage does not only reflect the Court’s decisions; it reconstructs the Court’s 
decisions according to the media’s criteria.214  Thus, a case can become CM in 
the literal sense if it is covered in a manner that creates a stir in public opinion 
even if from an internal legal perspective the case is not controversial (an “easy 
case”).  Similarly, public support for the Court as an institution is also 
dependent to a large extent on the manner in which the media covers the 
Court.215  The Court’s “symbolic image” as it is constructed by the media 
rather than only the content of its decisions may prove crucial for the 
emergence of the CM difficulty in the literal sense.216 
For most of the theorists who offer justifications for the Court’s CM 
authority (hereinafter “justification theorists”), the question of whether a case 
 
 211. See MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 124 (arguing that media exposure sets limits on how 
much the Court’s decision can influence public opinion). 
 212. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 6, at 2620–23 (“Only a small number of the cases attract 
the sort of media attention that cause them to stick in the public consciousness.”); Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“Instead of 
acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who 
attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media.”). 
 213. RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 16 
(1994) (quoting statements made by Chief Justice Warren). 
 214. See PAUL THALER, THE WATCHFUL EYE: AMERICAN JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE 
TELEVISION TRIAL xxii–xxiii, 3–4, 6, 71 (1994). 
 215. See Kelli L. Sager & Karan N. Frederiksen, Televising the Judicial Branch: In 
Furtherance of the Public’s First Amendment Rights, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1540 (1996) 
(quoting Justice Frankfurter who claimed that “the public confidence in the judiciary hinges on 
the public’s perception of it, and that perception necessarily hinges on the media’s portrayal of 
the legal system”). 
 216. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 34, at 139 (“The fortress of judicial review stands or falls 
with public opinion and the Court’s symbolic image is not forever indestructible.”); James L. 
Gibson, Judicial Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 514, 
526–27 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006) (suggesting that exposure to courts is typically 
associated with exposure to legitimizing symbols of courts thereby contributing to their 
legitimacy). 
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is visible to the public or not is immaterial.217  First, the question of public 
support is not at the center of their theories.  Their theories are mostly focused 
on the normative justifications of the Court’s decisions and these justifications, 
according to most of these theories, are unrelated to public opinion.  Second, 
justification theorists either view the question of public support as irrelevant or 
assume that public support will be achieved as a direct byproduct of the 
Court’s adherence to their normative theory.  Exhibiting its expertise in the 
realm of rights or constitutional history will award the Court with public 
support, or so it is assumed. 
Fredrick Schauer’s claim that the scholarly tendency to focus on visible 
cases “distorted the debates about judicial review and judicial supremacy,”218 
is perhaps correct as long as the discussion is restricted to the CM difficulty in 
the traditional sense.  Yet, for the discussion of the CM difficulty in its literal 
sense, only these exceptional cases are relevant.  These cases are “hard cases” 
for the Court according to the CM difficulty in its literal sense.  Non-salient 
cases are “easy cases” according to this logic since the Court can “go its own 
way” in deciding these cases, adhering strictly to its chosen justification 
theory.219 
VI.  JUDGMENT VS. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
In the Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton famously proclaimed that 
“[t]he judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the 
purse . . . . It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even 
for the efficacy of its judgments.”220  According to Hamilton, the government’s 
support, essential for the efficacy of the Court’s rulings, is acquired because 
the executive branch acknowledges the value of the Court’s judgment.221  
Thus, Hamilton based the Court’s power “merely” on its judicial expertise. 
 
 217. However, some justification theorists did devise mechanisms to confront issues of public 
support, and thus were not oblivious to questions of visibility.  For example, as elaborated above, 
Bickel devised his “passive virtues” to prevent the ill effect of certain kind of visible cases.  See 
supra Part IV. 
 218. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The Court’s Agenda - 
and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–12 (2006). 
 219. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 377 (“The Court also has a better chance of going its 
own way in cases that are of low public salience.”); WHITTINGTON, supra note 100, at 121–22 
(“Elected officials may tolerate and even favor judicial authority when the courts operate in issue 
areas of relatively low political salience.”).  Contra Giles, Blackstone & Vining, supra note 114, 
at 302, 304 (detailing empirical data showing that public opinion effects the justices more in non-
salient cases than in salient cases). 
 220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 221. Id. 
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Almost two hundred years later, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote in his 
dissenting opinion in Baker v.  Carr, “[t]he Court’s authority—possessed of 
neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public 
confidence in its moral sanction.”222  Other Justices have repeated this idea in 
various formulations.223  Though at first glance Justice Frankfurter’s argument 
seems like a paraphrase of Hamilton’s dictum in the Federalist No. 78, it is 
different in an important way.  Justice Frankfurter wrote that the Court’s power 
relies on “public confidence” in the Court’s “moral sanction”224 rather than 
“merely” on its “judgment.”225  The Court’s power lies then not “merely” in its 
expertise but in its ability to recruit public support. 
In fact, Justice Frankfurter’s argument is more reminiscent of an argument 
made two years before the Baker decision by Charles Black.  In his book The 
People and The Court, Black explained that judicial review would have been 
impossible “if public opinion had rejected it . . . because such an institution, 
founded in the end only on moral authority, could never have had the strength 
to prevail in the face of resolute public repudiation of its legitimacy.”226 
Hamilton’s view represents well the negative view of popular opinion held 
by many of the founders.227  Based on this view, Justices were given life tenure 
 
 222. 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  Justice Frankfurter emphasized 
the need of public support as basis for the Court’s legitimacy while dissenting from a decision 
which was the point of origin of the “one person, one vote” thesis.  Id.  This decision was part of 
a wider trend of promoting democracy and popular will as the foundational governing ideal of 
American Constitutional law.  Justice Frankfurter opposed the Court’s involvement in 
reapportionment because of his fear that it would undermine the Court’s legitimacy.  See Erwin 
Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About Bush v. Gore?, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 4 (2002). 
 223. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) 
(“The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that 
shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary . . . .”); Republican Party of Minn. v. 
White, 536 U.S. 765, 817–18 (2002) (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (“Because courts control neither 
the purse nor the sword, their authority ultimately rests on public faith in those who don the 
robe.”). 
 224. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 220, at 523. 
 226. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A 
DEMOCRACY 209 (1960). 
 227. See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 17, at 1–2 (“Hamilton’s views also reflected a then-
widely-held ‘classical’ view of public opinion.  During the 1600s and 1700s most political writers 
viewed mass public opinion as based largely upon emotion, not reason; as unstable and easily 
changeable; as coercive of individuality; and, very frequently, as contrary to higher, principled 
views of law and rights.  From this classical perspective, direct expressions of mass public 
opinion presented a serious threat to political and economic rights.”); DANIEL A. FARBER & 
SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 86 (2002) (“[M]any (if not most) of the drafters and ratifiers of 
the Constitution profoundly mistrusted the people, and structured the Constitution to put as little 
power as possible in the hands of the masses.”); Friedman, supra note 101, at 617–20 (“Thus, 
time and again during the period of drafting and ratification of the Constitution, the Framers 
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and salary protection to ensure their ability to resist shifts in the popular 
opinion and to reject majoritarian policies that run counter to the 
Constitution.228  The Court was viewed as one among several CM mechanisms 
that exist in the Constitution.229  In this spirit, Hamilton described judicial 
independence as “an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill 
humours in the society.”230 
Indeed, many of the Framers envisioned the Constitution as a constraint on 
majoritarian desires, binding the people to the right track.231  The judiciary’s 
role is to serve as a “safeguard” that ensures the Constitution’s binding effect.  
The judiciary is able to fulfill this role because it holds legal expertise required 
for interpreting a legal document such as the Constitution.232  In view of the 
“laborious study” required to “acquire a competent knowledge” of the law, 
Hamilton explained that only “few men . . . will have sufficient skill in the 
laws to qualify them for the stations of judges.”233 
The various justifications for the Court’s CM authority that were presented 
above are in line with Hamilton’s dictum.234  According to each of these 
justifications, the Justices hold a certain unique knowledge, training, or 
position that allows them to produce the correct constitutional judgment.  Yet 
while according to Hamilton, the Court’s expertise is restricted to the domain 
of legal doctrine, justification theorists understand that in view of the 
indeterminate nature of many constitutional norms, legal expertise cannot 
serve as the sole source for judgment.235  Thus, whether judicial expertise is in 
 
condemned the evil of faction and expressed fear of the tyranny of the majority.”); 2 JAMES 
BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 926 (1995) (1888) (arguing the Founders “conceived 
of popular opinion as aggressive, revolutionary, unreasoning, passionate, futile, and a breeder of 
mob violence”); Eule, supra note 20, at 1522–23 (describing the Framers’ distrust of majorities). 
 228. MARSHALL, supra note 93, at 1; FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 227, at 103–04 
(according to the founders’ beliefs, “one function of the Supreme Court is to preserve that 
venerable document [the Constitution] from the onslaughts of a temporarily impassioned 
majority”); ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 33 (“The Founders disagreed—building on their colonial 
experience, they took strong measures to protect the judges from political pressures.”). 
 229. See Friedman, supra note 101, at 620. 
 230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 220, at 528. 
 231. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 421 (Max Farrand ed., 
1937) (documenting Madison’s view that the role of constitutional constraints is “to protect [the 
people] agst. the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led”). 
 232. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 33 (“The only expertise the Founders recognized was of the 
legal variety . . . .”); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 16–17, 21 (2009) 
(criticizing Hamilton’s “idea that the courts embody ‘judgment,’ while the legislative and 
executive branches embody ‘will’”). 
 233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 220, at 529. 
 234. See supra Part II. 
 235. See, e.g., L.H. LaRue, Neither Force Nor Will, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 181 (1995) 
(“I do not recall anyone arguing [in recent controversies over judicial appointments] that a deep, 
scholarly knowledge of the precedents was the fundamental prerequisite for the job.  Why not?  
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the realm of enunciating values and articulating principles for the long term as 
Bickel suggests,236 or in the realm of constitutional history as Ackerman and 
the originalists proclaim,237 according to all these justification theorists, 
Justices hold expert abilities that are not restricted merely to the realm of legal 
doctrine. 
But Hamilton’s position was not only a result of his distrust of the 
multitude, he also had serious doubts as to whether Justices would be able to 
muster public support.  Arguing against assigning Supreme Court Justices a 
role in the impeachment process, Hamilton wrote that “it is still more to be 
doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority, which 
might, on certain occasions, be indispensable, towards reconciling the people 
to a decision, that should happen to clash with an accusation brought by their 
immediate representatives.”238 
At least in the early days of the Republic, one can find indications that 
Hamilton’s prediction was correct.239  For example, after Chief Justice Oliver 
Ellsworth fell ill, President John Adams turned to John Jay, asking him to 
return to the position.  Jay refused the appointment, explaining that the Court 
labored under a judicial system so defective that it could never “obtain the 
energy, weight, and dignity which are essential to its affording due support to 
the national government, nor acquire the public confidence and respect which, 
as the last resort of the justice of the nation, it should possess.”240  In the 
aftermath of the McCulloch decision, Ellsworth’s successor, Chief Justice 
Marshall, also acknowledged the truth of Hamilton’s observations.  In response 
 
Because none of us believes that our judges are ‘bound down by strict rules and precedents which 
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.’  None of 
us believes that Hamilton has correctly described the type of judiciary, the type of judges, that we 
live with today.”); Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. & POL. 239, 247–
53 (2011) (discussing the influence of the rise of the indeterminacy difficulty on the decline in the 
belief in legal expertise). 
 236. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 24, 58 (“[T]he root idea is that the process [of judicial review] 
is justified only if it injects into representative government something that is not already there; 
and that is principle . . . .”); id. at 68 (“The constitutional function of the Court is to define values 
and proclaim principles.”); id. at 188; BICKEL, supra note 176, at 175 (“The judicial process is 
too principle-prone and principle-bound—it has to be, there is no other justification or 
explanation for the role it plays.”). 
 237. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 227, at 98; BERGER, supra note 74, at 8–9, 18. 
 238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 220, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton); see also 
CHOPER, supra note 34, at 140. 
 239. Friedman, supra note 101, at 623 (“Not only did the Framers call the Supreme Court the 
‘least dangerous’ branch, but its prestige seemed to mirror this assessment of its power.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 240. Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1750 & n.161 (2001); William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: The First 
Hundred Years Were the Hardest, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 477–78 (1988). 
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to Virginia’s attack on the judgment, Marshall wrote (under a pseudonym), 
“[t]he judicial department, being without power, without patronage, without 
the legitimate means of ingratiating itself with the people, forms the weakest 
part.”241 
But after a while, the doubts regarding the Court’s ability to acquire public 
support were “dispelled.”242  In the current era, consistent empirical data 
demonstrates that since the 1970s, the public, though disagreeing at times with 
specific judgments, has mostly awarded the Court with a steady and relatively 
high level of confidence.243 
One may argue that the difference between Hamilton’s famous dictum and 
Frankfurter’s less famous one is merely a difference of paraphrasing of the 
same truism.  On the one hand, allegedly every institution requires public 
confidence to function properly.  This was a well-known premise even at the 
time Hamilton wrote the Federalist No. 78.244  Even with regards to the Court, 
it was known well before the invention of scientific public polling that its 
power “is moral, not physical; it operates by its influence, by public confidence 
in the soundness and uniformity of the principles on which it acts.”245  On the 
other hand, to recruit public confidence, the Court must rely on its expertise.  
After all, it lacks the sword and the purse.  Thus, even at the time of the 
framers, so the claim goes, it was well understood that the basis of the Court’s 
power is public confidence, and the way to gain that confidence was through 
demonstrating expertise.246 
 
 241. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 83. 
 242. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 1, at 129–30 (“Indeed, Jefferson, when writing to the 
Justices for their advisory opinion, spoke for a President who wanted their support because ‘their 
authority [would] insure the respect of all parties.’  The Court’s high ‘degree of credit’ is a fact of 
life, and has been at least since McCulloch v. Maryland was decided . . . .”). 
 243. See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring 
Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 355 tbl.1 (2003). 
 244. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, 
at 135 (1972) (“In classical Whig thought all rulers, whether English kings or Venetian doges, 
supposedly derived their powers ultimately from the people; election only made explicit what was 
always implicit.”); id. at 612 (discussing the eighteenth century view that all power was “derived 
from public opinion”). 
 245. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 618 (1840); see also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 
196, 223 (1882) (“While by the Constitution the judicial department is recognized as one of the 
three great branches among which all the powers and functions of the government are distributed, 
it is inherently the weakest of them all. . . . [W]ith no patronage and no control of the purse or the 
sword, their power and influence rest solely upon the public sense of the necessity for the 
existence of a tribunal to which all may appeal for the assertion and protection of rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution and by the laws of the land, and on the confidence reposed in the 
soundness of their decisions and the purity of their motives.”). 
 246. Moreover, some scholars suggest that during the early days of the Republic, the Court’s 
power was based on adherence to public opinion.  See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 60–63 (2004) (“Not 
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Yet exactly here lies the explanatory power of the distinction between the 
two CM difficulties, as it allows us to flesh out an important and delicate 
insight on the basis of the Court’s power.  According to the “merely judgment” 
thesis, the basis of the Court’s power is grounded in the Justices’ expertise in 
applying a justification theory.  The emphasis is on the Court’s adherence to 
the directive of its expert knowledge.247  Public confidence in the Court is 
assumed to be a mere contingent byproduct of such adherence.248  Moreover, 
as long as the executive is persuaded by the Court’s expertise and the system 
of governance as a whole possesses public confidence, public support of the 
Court is immaterial.249  The Constitutional Court of South Africa seems to 
present a current example of a court which lacks public confidence and whose 
power relies on its ability to persuade the dominant political party of its legal 
expertise.  As Theunis Roux explains, in view of the domination of a single 
political party in South Africa, the Constitutional Court can function properly 
over time even without public confidence.250  The Constitutional Court can 
ignore public opinion as a limit to its adherence to legal expertise, provided 
that the dominant political party is persuaded that the Constitutional Court 
adheres to the directive of legal expertise.251 
 
everyone agreed that judicial enforcement of a constitution was improper, however. . . . [C]ourts 
must exercise judicial review because they are the people’s agents too. . . . In refusing to enforce 
unconstitutional laws, judges were exercising the people’s authority to resist . . . .”); id. at 80–82, 
91–92 (“If judicial review was to occur, it would be . . . a ‘political-legal’ act, a substitute for 
popular resistance . . . .”); Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 49, 54 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997) (“[In the Federalist No. 78,] 
Hamilton implied . . . that the judges, though not elected, resembled the legislators and executives 
in being agents or servants of the people with a responsibility equal to that of the other two 
branches of government to carry out the people’s will, even to the point of sharing in the making 
of law.”); see also id. at 49, 58. 
 247. Cf. PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 127 (1997) (“Courts make a claim to knowledge that founds their 
power.”). 
 248. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921) 
(“Only experts perhaps may be able to gauge the quality of his work and appraise its significance. 
But their judgment, the judgment of the lawyer class, will spread to others, and tinge the common 
consciousness and the common faith.”). 
 249. Fiss, supra note 59, at 38 (“Legitimacy does not depend on popular approval of the 
institution’s performance . . . . It is the legitimacy of the political system as a whole that depends 
on the people’s approval, and that is the source of its democratic character.”). 
 250. Theunis Roux, Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 7 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 106, 106–12, 118–23 (2009). 
 251. Id. at 120 (arguing that the Court made clear in its second case that “its claim to 
legitimacy would be based on strict adherence to the law/politics distinction”); id. at 138 (noting 
“the CCSA’s reputation for legally credible decision making lending . . . the ANC government’s 
continued respect for, and obedience to, the CCSA’s decisions”). 
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Indeed, scholars today are too quick in switching from Hamilton’s dictum 
to the conclusion that the Court’s power is based on public confidence.252  
They thus fail to detect the shift in the understanding of the Court’s power that 
is partly the result of the rise of the opinion polls culture. 
In the era before the invention of public opinion polls, all the Court had 
was indeed “mere” expertise.  Besides elections, no other source of data could 
give direct, regular, and reliable measurements of public opinion.253  The 
public attitude toward the Court could have been deduced only indirectly, in a 
crude and inexact manner from the rare occasions when the Court was an issue 
in national presidential campaigns.254  As long as the elected branches were 
perceived as the central representation of public opinion, their attacks on the 
Court have served as the major informative signal on the Court’s waning 
public support.255  The elected players could thus always claim to hold public 
support for their position and there was no accepted public indicator to repute 
their claim.256 Even if the Court was perceived at some historical periods as the 
 
 252. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 157, at 67 (“Indeed, at least since Alexander Hamilton 
wrote in Federalist #78 that the Court is ‘possessed of neither force nor will, but merely 
judgment,’ students of American government have recognized that the Court is limited in its 
efficacy by the necessity of public and political will to give its decisions force.”). 
 253. ROBERT S. ERIKSON, NORMAN R. LUTTBEG & KENT L. TEDIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC 
OPINION: ITS ORIGINS, CONTENT, AND IMPACT 23 (2d ed. 1980) (“Before the advent of public 
opinion polls in the early 1930s, one had to rely on much more inexact measures of what the 
public was thinking. . . . But the most relied upon method of assessing public opinion prior to the 
opinion poll was the interpretation of election results, and the occasional referendum that 
managed to find its way onto the ballot.”); ADAM J. BERINSKY, SILENT VOICES: PUBLIC OPINION 
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 6 (2004) (“At an empirical level, there is a general 
agreement on one point among academics and professionals, be they proponents or opponents of 
the polling enterprise: opinion polls are broadly representative of popular sentiment.”). 
 254. See Rosenberg, supra note 155, at 380, 384–86 (stating the 1860, 1896, 1924 and 1964 
presidential campaigns at least partly focused on the proper role for the Court); see also OWEN M. 
FISS, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF 
THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 3–5 (2006) (noting the Court has been a major subject in the 
presidential elections of 1896 and 1912); FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 177–80 (arguing that 
during the Lochner period, “[j]udicial Review was a major issue in three presidential 
campaigns”).  Friedman’s three are the 1896, 1912, and 1924 elections.  Id. at 177–80. 
 255. CLARK, supra note 157, at 71, 80, 255–56 (“[S]pecifically, I have sought to demonstrate 
that congressional attacks on the Court can be interpreted as institutional signals about public 
opinion.”). 
 256. For example, in 1935, Arthor Krock reported that based on “letters” sent to President 
Roosevelt by private citizens, FDR had “strong evidence that a vast aggregation of people do not 
think that the Supreme Court…has either the legal or moral right” to thwart the administration’s 
decision to regulate money in a certain manner.  Arthur Krock, Gold Ruling Effects Weighed at 
Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1935, at E3.  In a reality in which public opinion polls are 
considered as the authoritative democratic legitimator and these polls show strong public support 
for the Court, such inference would be unavailable. 
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people’s delegate and the Justices were seen as representatives of the people,257 
no independent public indicator could confirm this claim to public legitimacy 
when a clash with the elected branches occurred. 
The ability to track public support for the Court, the public record of this 
support (often published by popular media), and the scientific allure of opinion 
polls made public confidence in the Court more “real” in public imagination.258  
The existence of a metric measuring public support of the Court, a metric that 
is central to political players’ own understanding of their power,259 opened new 
paths for understanding the Court’s basis of power.  Now the political branches 
may enforce the Court’s decisions not due to its expertise—as if they were the 
patient doing as the doctor ordered260—but due to the public support of the 
Court.261  Indeed, even when the Court is perceived to act politically i.e., not 
according to its expertise, as long as it holds public confidence, political 
resistance to its decisions seems unfeasible.  Public opinion is the drive wheel 
of American politics, and no politician wants to stand against it.262 
 
 257. See for example during the early days of the republic: WOOD, supra note 244, at 161 
(“[M]ost of the early constitution-makers had little sense that judicial independence meant 
independence from the people.”); id. at 448–49, 456, 460 (describing the position that “[t]he 
judges were in a sense as much agents of the people as the legislator”); id. at 546–49, 598 
(“Therefore all governmental officials, including even the executive and judicial parts of the 
government were agents of the people, not fundamentally different from the people’s nominal 
representatives in the lower houses of the legislatures.”); STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN 
POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE COURT: OPPOSITION POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO 
JUDICIAL POWER 72, 99, 133, 74–77 (2011) (“Taking the Constitution to be an artifact of popular 
sovereignty and judges as representatives of the people are cornerstones of judicial review’s 
original legitimacy.”); id. at 84–85 (noting that during the Founding generation, the dominant 
understanding was the “judicial interpretation should accord with the popular will since the 
Constitution is, by definition, an act of popular sovereignty”); id. at 104, 282. 
 258. See, e.g., Fried & Harris, supra note 14, at 323 (arguing that public opinion itself became 
more “real” making it a political source of legitimacy). 
 259. See Zizi Papacharissi, The Virtual Sphere 2.0: The Internet, the Public Sphere, and 
Beyond, in ROUTELDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNET POLITICS 230, 233 (Andrew Chadwick & 
Philip N. Howard eds., 2009) (“[P]oliticians, opinion leaders, and the media frequently rely on 
aggregations of public opinion obtained through polls . . . .”). 
 260. Cf. Peters (1995), supra note 12, at 5 (“Even today judges and physicians render legal or 
medical opinions: we are to understand that deciding a case or diagnosing an illness are acts of 
expert judgment, not of guaranteed truth.  To give an opinion, one must be an authority.”); KAHN, 
supra note 247, at 126 (“A judge’s knowledge of the rule of law functions analogously to a 
doctor’s knowledge of health. . . . Power flows from knowledge . . . .”). 
 261. See Georg Vanberg, Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to 
Constitutional Review, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 346, 351–52 (2001). 
 262. See JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: HOW PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES AMERICAN 
POLITICS xv–xvii (2004) (“Public opinion matters. . . . Its power is that it points always to the 
future, telling those whose careers and strategies depend on public support that success depends 
on being with the tide, not against it.”). 
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In the view of these changes, the Court may try to maintain its power as an 
institution by dissolving the CM difficulty in its literal sense.  In a reality in 
which the public has partly lost its belief in Justices as legal experts,263 
adhering to public opinion rather than to the directives of an expertise-based 
justification theory may seem as the only viable tactic to ensure that the Court 
can maintain its public support.264  Indeed, deciding according to the directives 
of expertise-based justification theory does not necessarily bring public 
support, especially if the public has lost its faith in legal expertise.  At times, 
deviating from the correct expert “judgment” may be the only way to ensure 
public support.  Justice Frankfurter fiercely objected to the idea of a Court 
directed by public opinion, naming it “despotic,”265 yet his idea of “public 
confidence” as the source of the Court’s power may lead in the end to judicial 
capitulation to public opinion. 
VII.  THE CM DIFFICULTY IN ITS LITERAL SENSE GOES ABROAD 
One of the few truisms in the field of comparative constitutionalism is that 
the scholarly obsession with the CM difficulty is a uniquely American 
phenomenon.266  It is not as important, so the claim goes, to the constitutional 
 
 263. Bassok, supra note 235, at 247–53 (describing the erosion in public perception of the 
Court’s expertise); Suzanna Sherry, Democracy’s Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline of 
Expertise, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 7, 11 (2011) (“[M]any people no longer see judges as possessing 
legal expertise.”). 
 264. Cf. ENGEL, supra note 257, at 15 (“[T]he Court has recently striven to justify its 
authority of majoritarian grounds.  Justices have emphasized the democratic credentials of their 
holdings, stressing how they follow majoritarian trends, however defined, evident in the broader 
polity.”); id. at 282 (Due to the decline of the belief in a fix and singular legal meaning, “the 
Court seemed to lose any special claim to interpretive authority.”); Friedman, supra note 101, at 
601 (“At any rate, examining the sources of constitutional decision makes increasingly apparent 
the extent to which judges seek to appeal to majoritarian values, if not to rely upon them 
entirely.”); Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of 
Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 40 (1993) 
(explaining that “[t]he joint opinion in Casey” that focused on the decision’s effects on the public 
support of the Court, “may also be symptomatic of a crisis of legitimacy in constitutional thought 
in which the generally accepted paradigms and modes of thought are no longer felt capable of 
yielding convincing solutions to constitutional questions”). 
 265. Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 557 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“Mr. Dooley’s ‘th’ Supreme Coort follows th’ iliction returns’ expressed the wit of 
cynicism, not the demand of principle.  A court which yields to the popular will thereby licenses 
itself to practice despotism, for there can be no assurance that it will not on another occasion 
indulge its own will.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review—and Why 
It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV.  2744, 2779–80 (2003) (“Americans grapple with, but 
never finally resolve, the ‘countermajoritarian’ problem . . . . European constitutions expressly 
provide for review and for the supremacy of constitutional courts with respect to constitutional 
interpretation.  European academics and constitutional judges will state as much in one breath, 
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discourse in other countries where national high courts play a central role.267  
The distinction between the two CM difficulties exposes that while the 
traditional difficulty may indeed play only a marginal role in the scholarly 
debates over the role of national high courts outside of the United States,268 the 
CM difficulty in its literal sense is very much present in those debates. 
Current comparative theories present the worldwide phenomenon of 
judicial empowerment as the work of political, economic, and judicial elites 
securing their interests over the preferences of the multitude.269  Based on 
“bottom-up” inquiry, Ran Hirschl argues that political elites, in association 
with economic and judicial elites, support constitutionalization and the shift 
towards “juristocracy” in order to preserve or enhance their political 
 
and then move on to more interesting issues.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and 
Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1996–97, 2002 (2004) (“While there of course 
remains anxiety in Europe about judicial overreaching in constitutional matters, the idea that 
constitutional law as such faces a fundamental theoretical difficulty in explaining its own 
democratic legitimacy—particularly in explaining the democratic legitimacy of counter-
majoritarian judicial review—no longer has nearly as much bite in Europe as it does in America.” 
(footnote omitted)); SADURSKI, supra note 167, at xiii (“Continental constitutional courts do not, 
therefore, feel any special reasons for anxiety about their own legitimacy when deciding on the 
constitutionality of statutes.”); Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the 
United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM: SCIENCE 
AND TECHNIQUE OF DEMOCRACY 165, 191 (Council of Eur. ed., 2005) (“As Dieter Grimm, a 
former justice on the German Constitutional Court, emphasizes, ‘. . . the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty, the perennial problem of American constitutional law, plays no role in Germany.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 267. See, e.g., Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY 
L.J. 837, 843 (1991) (“[T]he so-called ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty,’ the term Alexander 
Bickel used to describe the root problem of judicial review in America, is not a major problem in 
Germany.”). 
 268. The traditional difficulty is present in the debate over the power of regional courts such 
as the European Court of Justice.  However, the term used to describe the problem of 
unaccountability, at least in the European context, is “democratic deficit” rather than the CM 
difficulty. 
 269. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 11–12, 16, 37–40, 43–44, 47–49, 98–99, 169–172, 199, 210–218 
(2004) (arguing that elites seek to insulate their policy preferences from the vicissitudes of 
democratic politics); ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 
1, 8–9 (2003); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 18, 24–26, 30–33 (2003) (arguing that judicial review in new 
democracies is created by political elites that, at the time democratization occurs, foresee 
themselves losing in elections and thus seek to entrench judicial review as a form of “political 
insurance”); Rogers M. Smith, Judicial Power and Democracy: A Machiavellian View, in THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 199, 204–07 (Steven Kautz, et al. eds., 
2009) (“Powerful judiciaries are at bottom not partners of modern democracy, but efforts by elites 
to retain hegemony within them, as a Machiavellian analysis would lead us to expect.”). 
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hegemony.270  Since public support for the policy preferences of the elites is 
weakening, these threatened elites transfer power from majoritarian decision-
making arenas to unelected institutions such as national high courts thus 
ensuring the preservation of their hegemony.271 
Robert Bork contends that courts are “enacting the agenda of the cultural 
left” in “the culture war in every Western nation” against the “great mass of 
citizens who, left to their own devices, tend to be traditionalists.”272  Being a 
“political minority,” the cultural left, or as Bork titles them the “New Class,”273 
loses elections.  Hence, in order “to avoid the verdict of the ballot box,” and in 
order to “outflank majorities and nullify their votes,” the “New Class” 
empowers national high courts that tend to adopt the values of these elites.274 
Hirschl and Bork agree that as a descriptive matter, in the countries they 
examined, national high courts have entrenched the policies of the elites 
against public preferences.  These courts thus decide in a literally CM fashion.  
Thus, while Hirschl is correct in arguing that his juristocracy theory is not 
preoccupied “with the well-rehearsed normative debate over the 
‘countermajoritarian’ nature of judicial review,”275 his theory, as well as 
Bork’s, is modeled according to the CM difficulty in its literal sense.  Hirschl 
describes courts deciding cases contrary to the majority’s will. 
Bork and Hirschl mainly disagree on the values that guide the elites in their 
endeavor to transfer fundamental public, political and moral disputes to courts.  
While Hirschl claims that judicial empowerment is an “institutional solution” 
for promoting a neo-liberal agenda of “open markets, economic deregulation, 
anti-statism, and anticollectivism,”276 Bork argues that judicial empowerment 
 
 270. HIRSCHL, supra note 269, at 11; see also id. at 75, 78, 80–81 (Canada), 88–89 (New 
Zealand), 92–95 (South Africa). 
 271. Id. at 12, 16, 40 (“Accordingly, a strategic, political-power-oriented explanation for 
voluntary, self-imposed judicial empowerment through the constitutionalization of rights and the 
establishment of judicial review suggests that political power-holders who either initiate or refrain 
from blocking such reforms estimate that it enhances their absolute or relative political power vis-
à-vis rival political actors.”); id. at 49, 98–99. 
 272. BORK, supra note 269, at 2 (describing the struggle between the “elite” and “the general 
public”). 
 273. Id. at 5–6. 
 274. Id. (“The judiciary is the liberals’ weapon of choice.”); id. at 9–10 (“The ideas and 
values of the New Class are part of the furniture of most judges’ minds and seem self-evident.”); 
id. at 109 (“[T]hey are speaking for values of the New Class that have not yet found, and perhaps 
never can find, favor in the legislature.”). 
 275. HIRSCHL, supra note 269, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 276. Id. at 12, 43–44 (arguing that elites promote through the judiciary an agenda of 
“[r]elative cosmopolitanism, open markets, formal equality, and Lockean-style individual 
autonomy”); id. at 118 (“All four national high courts . . . fortify and expand the boundaries of the 
private sphere . . .”); id. at 146–48. 
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is actually aimed to promote the values of “eclectic socialism” held by “the 
cultural or liberal left.”277 
But here is the puzzle: While these and other leading accounts explain the 
rise of judicial power as an elite endeavor against the populus, opinion polls 
consistently show that many national high courts receive high public support as 
institutions.278  If national high courts act in the name of elites “insulating 
policy making in general, and their policy preferences in particular, from the 
vicissitudes of democratic politics,”279 how is it that these courts have received 
over a long period of time such high public institutional support?  If these 
courts have been preserving the interests of elites whose public support is 
eroding,280 if “an activist judiciary helps to advance the ends that democratic 
branches of government would never sanction,”281 how do these courts succeed 
 
 277. BORK, supra note 269, at 2–3, 8 (“In a word, courts in general have enlisted on the 
liberal side of the culture war.  They are infected, as is the New Class to which judges belong and 
to which they respond, with the socialist impulse.”); id. at 10 (“Everywhere judicial review has 
taken root, activist courts enforce New Class values, shifting the culture steadily to the left.”); id. 
at 31 (“The Left wants expanded judicial review in the name of rights . . . .”). 
 278. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of 
National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 344 (1998) (surveying data on public support 
of national high courts from eighteen countries); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH 
JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 139 (2000) (noting that in Europe constitutional 
courts have high “institutional legitimacy”); SADURSKI, supra note 167, at 33 (“[It] is 
indisputable that the constitutional courts in the region discussed here [Central and Eastern 
Europe] enjoy a high level of social acceptance, despite occasional disagreements with and 
criticisms of particular decisions.  They do not, therefore, have a problem with ‘legitimacy’ in the 
sense of a general public acceptance of their authority to do what they are doing—including the 
invalidation of statutes.”); Law, supra note 21, at 791 (“In [the US] and elsewhere, courts known 
for striking down supposedly majoritarian legislation have nevertheless enjoyed high levels of 
public support that put other government institutions to shame.”); F.L. MORTON & RAINER 
KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION & THE COURT PARTY 17 (2000) (“In the [1987 and 1999 
national surveys in Canada], 62 per cent expressed greater confidence in courts and judges than in 
legislatures and politicians when it came to having the final say on rights issues.”).  However, as 
noted above, the Constitutional Court of South Africa enjoys a very low level of public support.  
Roux, supra note 250, at 107.  While Bork and Hirschl do not examine courts in Latin America, it 
is interesting to note that the rise in judicial power in Latin America has occurred while these 
courts suffer from a low level of public support.  See Gretchen Helmke, Public Support and 
Judicial Crises in Latin America, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 397, 398 (2010) (“One of the most 
widely touted facts about the rule of law gap in Latin America is how poorly the public regards 
the judiciary.”); GRETCHEN HELMKE, COURT UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND 
PRESIDENTS IN ARGENTINA 1–2 (2005) (“[In Latin America], judges today are less popular than 
presidents, the military, or the police. . . . Latin America’s courts have become vitally important 
political institutions.”). 
 279. HIRSCHL, supra note 269, at 11–12; see also id. at 98–99; BORK, supra note 269, at 6 
(“Democracy and the rule of law are undermined while culture is altered in ways the electorate 
would never chose.”). 
 280. HIRSCHL, supra note 269, at 12. 
 281. BORK, supra note 269, at 11; see also id. at 77–78 (referring to the U.S. Supreme Court). 
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in preserving their public support over a long period of time?  In other words, 
if national high courts consistently decide cases against public preferences, i.e. 
deciding literally in a CM fashion, how is it that these courts remain 
majoritarian institutions in the literal sense?  This fascinating puzzle has yet to 
receive any elaborate scholarly attention.282 
CONCLUSION: THE TWO CM DIFFICULTIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
The introduction of public opinion polls created substantial changes in 
American political thought.283  The manner in which we understand the CM 
difficulty is a vivid example of these changes.  For many years, the clash 
between constitutionalism and popular sovereignty, also known as the CM 
difficulty, was understood as a problem of unaccountable judges who 
invalidate legislation enacted by electorally accountable representatives.  
Opinion polling introduced quantitative results of opinion surveys as a new 
form of popular sovereignty.284  As a result, in recent years, constitutional 
scholars have attempted to discard any understanding of the difficulty which 
cannot be measured.  Thus, many of them, influenced by social science studies 
of the Court, formulate the difficulty in completely measurable terms, as a 
clash between public opinion, measured in opinion polls and the Court’s 
decisions.285  This formulation of the difficulty reduces popular sovereignty to 
mere responsiveness to public opinion and dismantles the presumed connection 
between popularly elected legislators and majority will.286  It fits well the 
American tendency, stretching back to the early days of the republic, of 
 
 282. One answer to this puzzle is “give it time.” According to this answer, it takes time for the 
public to digest the change in the courts’ function.  As soon as the public acknowledges the shift, 
public confidence in the courts will decline rapidly.  Another explanation is “blame the media.”  
According to this explanation, the media presents the rise of judicial power as a positive 
development thus effecting public perception.  Both of these explanations are backed by the 
Israeli experience.  The Israeli Supreme Court, that served as “exhibit A” in many of the accounts 
on the rise of judicial power, has experienced in recent years a sharp decline in its public support.  
For an elaboration of these and other explanations in the Israeli case see Or Bassok, Television 
Coverage of the Israeli Supreme Court 1968–1992: The Persistence of the Mythical Image, 42 
ISR. L. REV. 306, 307–08 (2009); MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 
154–169 (2011). 
 283. Cf. JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY 
91–92 (1995) (arguing that the American political system was transformed by a new method of 
assessing public attitudes, i.e. the opinion polling). 
 284. SCOTT L. ALTHAUS, COLLECTIVE PREFERENCES IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 6 (2003). 
 285. See PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 12 (2011) (“In place of the popular sovereign, the political scientist today speaks 
of popular majorities and of the forces that effect electoral politics—all measurable entities.”). 
 286. See GINSBURG, supra note 269, at 1 (“The superior position of the popularly elected 
legislature and its corollary of majority rule have been central principles for democratic 
revolutionaries since the notion was appended to the unwritten English constitution.”). 
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understanding democracy in populist and majoritarian terms.287  In the current 
“public opinion culture,” the role of majority opinion, as measured by public 
polls, has become even more central.  Now it is indeed “the master of servants 
who tremble before it.”288 
While many constitutional theorists continue to devise normative 
justifications for judicial review,289 other theorists have taken a new path.  
Dissolving the CM difficulty became a major tactic for confronting the 
difficulty.290  Rather than conceptualizing the difficulty as an inherent 
normative question concerning the Court’s authority, these theorists view the 
CM difficulty as a question concerning the Court’s actual performance.291  As 
long as the Court’s decisions correspond to public opinion, no difficulty exists.  
Thus, the debate over democratic legitimacy is focused not on the justifications 
for the institution’s decisions but on the way public opinion responds to 
highly-salient decisions taken by the institution.292 
Fifty years ago, Alexander Bickel identified the dangers lurking for a 
Court that capitulates to public opinion.  In response, he suggested the device 
of “passive virtues” that enables the Court to avoid the most volatile 
controversies.  Today, in view of the current focus on the literal CM difficulty, 
other techniques, such as “stealth overruling” of highly salient precedents, are 
 
 287. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 244, at 362, 368–69; Steven Barnett, Distorting 
Democracy: Public Opinions, Polls, and the Press, in PUBLIC OPINION & DEMOCRACY VOX 
POPULI-VOX DEI?, supra note 12, at 287, 288–90; ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, 
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 17 
(2012) (arguing that constitutional democracy in the US seeks to instantiate the value of self-
government by rendering government decisions responsive to public opinion); CHOPER, supra 
note 34, at 2 (“[J]udicial review is incompatible with a fundamental precept of American 
democracy—majority rule . . . .”); id. at 4–5. 
 288. BRYCE, supra note 86, at 267, 923 (“[P]ublic opinion stands out, in the United States, as 
the great source of power, the master of servants who tremble before it.”); see also Jeff Manza, 
Fay Lomax Cook & Benjamin I. Page, Navigating Public Opinion: An Introduction, in 
NAVIGATING PUBLIC OPINION: POLLS, POLICY, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3, 
4 (Jeff Manza, Fay Lomax Cook & Benjamin I. Page eds., 2002) (surveying commentators that 
criticize the development of “poll driven leadership”). 
 289. See, e.g., Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 991 
(2006). 
 290. See, e.g., Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755, 757 (2011) 
(“Today’s external legal history is marred by . . . ‘consensus constitutionalism,’ the claim that the 
Supreme Court interprets the Constitution in a manner that reflects the ‘consensus’ views of the 
American public.”). 
 291. Cf. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE 
MODERN STATE 173 (2005) (“[Q]uestions about the origins or constitution of the state tend to 
fade from view, to be replaced with questions about its day-to-day performance.”). 
 292. Cf. id. at 174 (arguing that currently the debate over legitimacy is conducted in terms of 
performance rather than origins). 
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surfacing.293  Indeed, in a sense the shift in scholarly emphasis from the 
traditional difficulty to the literal difficulty is merely a shift from the first part 
of The Least Dangerous Branch to the book’s second part. 
 
 
 293. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda 
v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 1, 4–5, 29, 33, 46–50, 62–63 (2010) (arguing that, fearful the 
overruling of a precedent would hinder the Court’s public support, Justices overruled it under the 
public radar in order to avoid publicity and, thus, public scrutiny). 
